Idaho Conservation League * Boundary Backpackers * Moscow
ICL* Panhandle Environmental League * Washington Native
Plant Society * Northwest Rivers Council * Kootenai Tribe of
Idaho * Idaho Wildlife Federation * Inland Northwest
Wildlife Council * National Wildlife Federation * Idaho
Environmental Council * John Osborn, MD * Northern Rockies
Chapter Sierra Club * The Wilderness Society * Idaho
Sportsmens Coalition * Spokane Audubon Society * Inland
Empire Backcountry Horsemen * Kootenai Environmental
Alliance * Washington Wilderness Coalition * Selkirk-Priest
Basin Association, Appellants.
REPLY
to
the
RESPONSIVE
STATEMENT
for
the
IDAHO
CONSERVATION LEAGUE ET AL. APPEAL
(#2130)
of
the
USFS
PLAN FOR THE IDAHO PANHANDLE NATIONAL
FORESTS
September
29, 1989
Idaho
Panhandle Forest Issues
(tier to the USFS responsive statement)
Editorial
note:
Citizens
interested in the second "round" of forest planning may find
it useful to reflect on the first round of forest planning
in the 1980s. This document focuses on an excellent teaching
case, the Idaho Panhandle National Forests
(IPNF).
Inland
Northwest sporting and conservation groups and the Kootenai
Tribe of Idaho appealed the US Forest Service's (USFS) 10-15
year plan for the IPNF in 1987. The Forest Service responded
with its "responsive statement".
The
following document is our "reply" to the federal
government's responsive statement. It is based partly on a
review of the USFS planning files in the basement of the
Supervisor's Office in Coeur d'Alene (for which USFS
personnel are to be thanked), and is a useful overview of
issues in forest planning for the Idaho Panhandle.
Logging
truck convoys, timber industry rallies, and the fomenting of
anger against forest conservationists marked the spring and
summer of 1988. During that period the USFS cleaved off the
roadless issue from the rest of our appeal, and fast-tracked
its decision to reopen roadless areas to logging. Thus, the
roadless issue is missing from the list of 24
issues.
The
Inland Empire Public Lands Council was formally established
the same year as this Reply was filed, 1989, bringing
together sporting, outdoor recreation, and environmental
groups concerned about forest destruction in the Inland
Northwest. "The Council" developed a Forest Watch program
that became a national model for citizen grassroots
involvement in the federal timber sale program. Corruption
and forest damage eventually led the Council in the late
1990s to call for an end to commercial logging in America's
National Forests.
In
1995, about eight years after the appeal was filed, the USFS
denied all of the issues and concerns we raised in our
appeal of the IPNF forest plan. The federal agency directed
citizens to participate in individual timber sales that flow
from the IPNF Plan. But by 1995, the year of the "Salvage
Rider", Congress and the USFS were taking steps to restrict
or even eliminate citizen oversight of the federal timber
sale program.
Forest
Planning on the IPNF can be thought of as a shell game. The
USFS decided that key issues would be deferred to planning
for individual timber sales, and not the overall Plan for
this 2.5 million acres forest. But when you look at the
individual timber sales, the federal agency would justify
more forest damage by invoking the Forest Plan.
In
this shellgame played with the National Forests, the USFS
shifts decisions like "shells on the table"; the concerned
public is left "searching for the pea."
As
we have often noted over the past 20 years, there are many
fine and dedicated people within the U.S. Forest Service.
Under President Teddy Roosevelt's and Chief Forester
Pinchot's visionary leadership, there was no finer public
agency: the Forest Service was infused with esprit de corps
and a moral commitment to saving America's forests. Although
Teddy Roosevelt's and Gifford Pinchot's legacy survives,
"follow-the-money" corruption of timber politics and agency
budgets threatens this public agency and our National
Forests.
Our
public lands are too often managed as political spoils:
forest destruction veiled by deceptive marketing rather than
decisions based on science, sound economics, and ethics.
This--combined with the Coeur d'Alene Basin's massive
Superfund cleanup of mine wastes--makes the USFS's forest
planning process on the Idaho Panhandle an excellent
teaching case for historians, agency personnel, policy
makers, and the general public interested in the fate of
America's National Forests.
- &endash;John
Osborn, MD
- January
5, 2004
"Ultimately,
of course, it is not better documents but better
decisions that count. NEPA's purpose is not to generate
paperwork--even excellent paperwork--but to foster
excellent action. The NEPA process is intended to help
public officials make decisions that are based on
understanding of environmental consequences, and take
actions that protect, restore, and enhance the
environment. These regulations provide the direction to
achieve this purpose."
40
C.F.R. Sec 1500.1(c)
This
reply statement is in response to the Regional Forester's
Responsive Statement of Mr. John Mumma, dated April 3, 1989,
on the appeal of the Idaho Panhandle National Forests Land
and Resource Land Management Plan (#2130).
The
deadline for our reply was extended to Sept. 25, 1989, in a
letter dated July 27, 1989, from George M. Leonard, Office
of the Chief. This reply is in compliance with 36 C.F.R.
Sect 211.18(d)(2) as pertaining to timeliness.
New
information is provided in this reply to supplement the
appellants' Statement of Reasons (SOR) . The absence of a
response should in no way be construed as abandoning issues
raised in the SOR.
In
general the Plan is subject to interpretations which afford
the U.S. Forest Service (USFS) broad discretion for project
level forest plan implementation. If anyone chooses to
question a project level decision, the Forest Service can
simply point back to the Forest Plan. If anyone questions
the inadequacy of the Forest Plan, the Forest
Service
points them to project level decisions. The result is a
"shell game" with Public resources. This issue is now before
the federal courts because of the severance of the roadless
issue from the other issues raised in our appeal of the
Panhandle Plan. The "shell game," however, is not limited to
the roadless issue. Indeed, it pervades the entire planning
process.
ISSUE 1. THE PLAN RELIES ON CLEARCUT LOGGING AND FAILS TO
CONSIDER VALUE-BASED ALTERNATIVES THAT RELY ON SELECTIVE
FOREST MANAGEMENT.
The
Plan fails to demonstrate that clearcut logging is the
optimum timber harvest method for any of the proposed timber
sales on the Idaho Panhandle National Forests (IPNF). Thus
the Plan violates the National Forest Management Act (NFMA)
and its implementing regulations. The Plan also fails to
insure that clearcut logging is employed only where it can
be carried out consistent with the protection of soils,
watersheds, fish, wildlife, recreation, aesthetic resources,
forest regeneration and habitat for species of
concern.
Failing
to develop alternatives that adequately address the high
level of Public concern over clearcutting e.g. precluding it
in areas of intermixed ownership), the USFS has violated 16
U.S.C. sec. 604(g)(1), 42 U.S.C. sec 4332 (2)(C) and (E), 36
C.F.R. sec 219.12, and 40 C.F.R. sec 1502.14(a).
A.
SELECTIVE MANAGEMENT, NOT CLEARCUTTING, SHOULD BE THE MAJOR
MEANS OF LOGGING IN THE NATIONAL FORESTS, INCLUDING THE
IDAHO PANHANDLE NATIONAL FORESTS.
1.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
From
1897 to 1974, selection management was the only legal method
for harvesting timber in the National Forests. The USFS's
reliance on clearcutting in the National Forest System is a
controversial Public issue. For example, Rep. Steve Symms
spoke of the clearcutting problem when in 1976 the U.S.
House of Representatives considered the National Forest
Management Act: "If we want to pass [NFMA] . . . .
the Church guidelines are one of the things with which I
think our friends from urban districts with environmental
concerns maybe feel more comfortable." H.R. 15,069, 94th
Cong. , 2d Sess. Sec 6 (f ) (4) - (5) (1976) as quoted in 64
Or. L. Rev. 1, 158 (1985).
The
Church guidelines are named for Sen. Frank Church, who in
1971 chaired Senate hearings on clearcutting [Subcomm.
on Public Lands of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 92nd Cong., 2D Sess., Clearcutting on Federal
Timberlands 3-4(Comm. Print 1972)]. These guidelines are
important because they
- (1)
form a legislative foundation for the NFMA as it relates
to clearcutting, and
- (2)
control harvesting practices in National Forests prior to
USFS's release of final forest plans [64 Or. L. Rev.
1, 155-159 (1985)].
2.
USFS RESPONSE FOR CLEARCUTTING ON THE IDAHO PANHANDLE IS
INADEQUATE
The
USFS's response (A-3) to our concerns is that Public comment
did not point to the issue as one of major importance. To
cite lack of Public concern about clearcutting shows a
callous disregard of the history of forest planning, as well
as Public laws and guidelines to "protect, restore, and
enhance the environment." It is beyond challenge that
clearcutting is harmful to certain wildlife. Clearcutting is
also unsightly and can cause massive erosion when practiced
on steep slopes. Selection management is well supported by
scientific literature and professional
experience.
B.
LOGGING TECHNIQUES ON THE IDAHO PANHANDLE: THE LEGAL
REQUIREMENTS
(1)
NEPA
The
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and its
implementing regulations require federal agencies to
consider a broad range of alternatives when planning major
federal actions that significantly affect the quality of the
human environment. The Council on Environmental Quality
considers the "alternatives" section of the EIS to be "the
heart" of the document. 40 C.F.R. Sec. 1502.14 Agencies
preparing an EIS must "[r]igorously explore and
objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives." 40 C.F.R.
Sec. 1502.14(a)
(2)
NFMA
The
National Forest Management Act (NFMA) requires the USFS to
prepare forest plans in accordance with NEPA. 16 U.S.C. Sec.
1604(g)(1). Forest plans must include "a broad range of
reasonable alternatives according to NEPA procedure." 36
C.F.R. Sec. 219.12(f). The reviewed alternatives must
"reflect to the extent practicable the full range of major
commodity and environmental resource uses and values that
could be produced from the forest." 36 C.F.R. Sec.
219.12(f)(1). The alternatives considered in a forest plan
EIS must also "provide different ways to address and respond
to the major public issues, management concerns and resource
opportunities identified during the planning process." 36
C.F.R. Sec. 219.12(f )(4). The development of alternatives
is essential for informed Public participation and reasoned
decision-making.
NFMA
states that the agency shall provide for Public
participation is the development, review, and revision of
land management plans. 16 USC Sec. 1604 (d). The USFS is the
lead agency in developing the land management plan for the
three National Forests that comprise the administrative unit
entitled "Idaho Panhandle National Forests." The agency has
a responsibility to assist the Public in understanding and
developing issues and alternatives.
C.
VALUE-BASED ALTERNATIVES
(1)
THE NEED AND THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A VALUE-BASED
ALTERNATIVE
Given
the growing concern about cost inefficiency in managing the
National Forests, a cost efficient (value-based) alternative
should have been presented to the Public for review. The
USFS did not include an alternative (or alternatives) based
on timber values rather than volume, and therefore failed to
respond to the issue of intensive timber management on good
tree-growing sites.
The
alternatives in the Plan are based on timber volume, but
rarely mention timber value. The USFS writes in documents
outside of forest planning documents that a difference
clearly exists between managing a forest for timber value
and for timber volume:
Existing
timber management plans are based on volume criteria. We
need to be careful not to make the assumption that these
volume criteria are necessarily the same as financial (or
value) criteria. In order to meet volumes called for in
the approved plans and anticipated timber sell targets,
the volume criteria must take precedence over the value
criteria. Such investments can contribute to inflation
and prolong reallocation of resource to more productive
uses.
[USDA
Forest Service. Idaho Panhandle National Forests
Timber Harvest Program Analysis and Evaluation, June
1981]
During
the planning process timber corporate representatives raised
concerns about the USFS proposals to change utilization
standards in the Forest Plan. (See for example the USFS
response dated Feb. 18, 1983, to the representative for
Idaho Forest Industries, Inc. on this issue, IPNF Planning
Document 3660. See also IPNF Planning Document 123 dated
Sept. 28, 1982, which describes the possibility of reducing
FORPLAN timber volumes if current utilization standards were
used.] The concerns expressed by the timber industry
help to underscore the important distinction between timber
volumes and timber values--a distinction not addressed in
the forest plan.
The
alternative of growing quality wood in sustainable forests
was recently reviewed by Mark Wigg, a consulting forester in
Salem, Oregon. [Wigg, Mark and Anae Boulton. "Quality
Wood, Sustainable Forests: A New Agenda for Managed Forests
in the Northwest" in Forest Watch Jan/Feb
1989]
Wigg
notes that the Pacific Northwest grows some of the finest
and most valuable wood in the world. The quality of the wood
attracts buyers from every region of the world. He goes on
to point out that "We can manage for quality wood over long
rotations while preserving logging jobs, creating
high-paying new jobs, generating millions of dollars in
revenues, and protecting the forests we love." 91;p.
8.]
(2)
THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A VALUE-BASED
ALTERNATIVE
The
legal requirements for presenting alternatives in an EIS are
(1) NEPA (42 U.S.C. Sec. 4332(2)(c)(iii)] requires " a
detailed statement . . . on--(iii) alternatives to the
proposed action" and (2) 40 C.F.R. 1502.14 supplements this
by stating that "agencies shall: (a) rigorously explore and
objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives." The NFMA
regulations also address the requirement of considering
alternatives in the development of forest plans. 36 C.F.R.
219.12(f) provides that "the interdisciplinary team shall
formulate a broad range of reasonable alternatives according
to NEPA procedures."
Because
the USFS did not develop alternatives which emphasize timber
value, the Plan for the three National Forests that comprise
the IPNF does not "rigorously explore and evaluate all
reasonable alternatives" and violates NEPA.
(3)
LIKELY IMPACTS OF HIGH VOLUME BASED ALTERNATIVES NOT
DISCLOSED TO THE PUBLIC.
In
the USFS response labelled A-4, the agency does not respond
to the issues of the effect of dumping large volumes of
federal timber into the timber markets, depressing timber
prices and receipts for other timberland owners: small
woodlot owners, corporate timberland owners, Native American
reservation lands, and State timberlands.
The
USFS's rationale for the Forest Plan logging levels is "to
help assure a continuing supply of timber products and to
help support local industry in timber dependent
communities." ROD. pg. 9. This rationale is based on the
Forest Service's Exhibit 3: USDA Forest Service, A Report
on Idaho's Timber Supply, Feb, 1987.
This
timber supply analysis has been critically reviewed in
conservationists' appeal of the Payette National Forest
Plan, and is enclosed and labeled "Exhibit l". This exhibit
documents that the Idaho Timber Supply Analysis is an
inaccurate basis for justifying agency decision-making for
the forest plans in Idaho.
While
dumping higher volumes of Public timber on the markets may
benefit large automated timber mills over the short run,
dumping higher volumes of federal timber in the timber
marketplace will lower timber prices in the Inland
Northwest. This will be a negative incentive for other
timberland owners to invest in forestry. Increased logging
on one ownership will decrease logging on another ownership.
Increasing timber volumes in the marketplace will drop the
price of timber--reducing returns for all timberland owners.
With lower prices for timber, small and large forest owners
may lack the incentive to make the long term financial
commitments for sustainable forestry necessary to compete
with the federal government's subsidized timber from the
National Forests. Rather than plan for the long-term
economic health of their land and workers, private
timberland owners may "liquidate" for short term economic
gain. Reduced timber prices may induce a reduction in timber
sale offerings on Idaho State school endowment lands,
reducing funds for Public education.
The
USFS justifies the Plan with the argument of "community
stability," but does not disclose a scholarly analysis of
impacts on "community stability," violating NEPA.
ISSUE 2. 280 MMBF ASQ IS A POLITICAL FIGURE, NOT BASED ON
SCIENCE AND SCHOLARSHIP AND REPRESENTS "TOP-DOWN" NOT
"BOTTOM-UP" PLANNING
The
USFS used a timber target early during the planning process
for the IPNF: a Resource Planning Act (RPA) goal for timber.
The agency built the forest plan around this pre-selected
timber target. The results of this decision as it was
carried out on the IPNF are:
- (1)
the USFS has not carried out the "bottom-up" planning
approach envisioned by NFMA and the legislative history
of NFMA;
- (2)
the USFS has overestimated the amount of timber available
on the IPNF; and
- (3)
the USFS has failed to disclose new information developed
between the draft and the final plan pertaining to
impacts and resource trade-offs of carrying out the
USFS's timber program under the Plan, in violation of
NEPA.
The
results of the "top-down" planning are many, and include the
very real possibility of growing Public unacceptance of USFS
decisions when the Public realizes that reductions in water
quality, fish, elk, visual beauty, and other resources are
based on politics and not scholarly and scientific analysis
and decisions in keeping with the intent of Congress in
passing NFMA.
Because
of the importance of the timber target to the Plan, and to
the IPNF, appellants wish to review for the USFS the history
of the timber target in the USFS's planning process for the
IPNF. This will be followed by a discussion of RPA, and the
inaccurate use of RPA by the USFS in developing its plan for
the IPNF.
A.
HISTORY OF THE ASQ FOR THE IPNF
USFS
planners and planning documents acknowledge that the timber
target was based historically on RPA goals.
Documents
in the forest planning files at USFS Supervisor's Office for
the IPNF show the development of the timber targets f or the
Plan. This history of the IPNF forest plan is complicated,
and can best be understood in the following
periods:
- (1)
1979-1983: Critical formative period, in which the USFS
made substantive decisions for the IPNF's forest plan.
This period ended when Reagan Administration official,
John B. Crowell, Jr., ordered the USFS to stop forest
planning nationwide.
- (2)
1983-1985: USFS reworked IPNF forest plan to comply with
directives from the Reagan Administration. The IPNF
forest plan was reviewed by the Washington, D.C. office
of the USFS and the US Dept of Agriculture before being
released to the Public in draft form for review and
comment.
- (3)
1985-1986: USFS reviewed Public comment on the IPNF plan,
and began to develop the final plan. USFS officials
document their inability to find timber to meet the USFS
timber targets. Without Public disclosure or process, the
agency decided on sacrificing other resources in order to
maintain timber targets.
- (4)
1986-1987: Reagan Administration shut down forest
planning in Idaho. The USFS proceeded with developing an
analysis of overall timber supply in Idaho, and refused
to undertake a similar level of analysis for other
multiple-use resources.
- (5)
Sept. 17, 1987: The USFS completed the forest plan for
the IPNF with the signing of the Record of
Decision.
(1)
1979-1983: CRITICAL FORMATIVE YEARS
The
timber target established by RPA is the historic basis for
the USFS's timber target that ultimately appears in the
final forest plan. In approving the USFS's criteria for
selecting a preferred alternative, the Regional Forester
wrote to the IPNF Forest Supervisor on June 23, 1980, and
directed that "[t]he preferred alternative should
meet or exceed RPA program objectives assigned to the Forest
by the Regional Forester or contained in the Regional Plan."
[Planning document 3203)
The
RPA goal for timber remained important to the USFS planning
team for the IPNF in developing a preferred alternative. In
1982, for example, the planning team was building a
preferred alternative around the RPA goal approved by the
Regional Forester. [IPNF Planning Document 1777, March
23, 1982]. The goal of achieving 100 percent of the
average RPA target for decades 1-5 in developing a preferred
alternative is noted in a document discussing a possible
preferred alternative. [IPNF Planning Document 1772
April 7, 1982]. On April 12, 1982, the USFS Planning
Team was using the assigned RPA goal of 275 MMBF in shaping
the Preferred Alternative FORPLAN Runs. [IPNF Planning
Document 1771]. On May 4, 1982, the Forest Supervisor
tentatively decided to use the RPA goal for the preferred
alternative. [IPNF Planning Document 1767] Yet the
Forest Supervisor wrote of concerns that this timber target
could not be met, and consistent with goals for water
quality, fish, elk, and other resources on the
IPNF:
Many
of you have expressed concern that 10-year harvest plans
at current output levels cannot be met if all of the
above constraints are met. I share your concern. Even if
the FORPLAN analysis indicates the allocations and
schedule of this iteration are feasible, we have a big
job ahead in preparing an implementable Forest
Plan.
In
this same letter, the Forest Supervisor decided to proceed
with a planning model that continued logging activities in
already impacted watersheds. He also decided to open parts
of entire elk sanctuaries to the computer modeling process
in order to achieve the RPA goal.
The
USFS was willing to make additional sacrifices of Public
resources in order to meet its timber goals. For example,
the USFS considered a preferred alternative which would road
and log the Turner-Nelson roadless area (the third most
valuable elk sanctuary on the IPNF) "in order to meet timber
sale objectives in 1st decade. Higher number of suitable
acres in Turner-Nelson." [IPNF Planning Document
1757]. Although elk hunters and wildlife enthusiasts
were given the Slate Creek Area instead, this decision
illustrates the importance of the timber target to the USFS
in developing the forest plan-and the extent to which the
USFS was willing to sacrifice Public resources in order to
meet timber targets based on the RPA goal.
By
1982 the USFS recognized that it would be unable to meet its
RPA goal because of water quality and road access
constraints. [IPNF Planning Document 1757 of July 6,
1982, shows the timber target based on the RPA goal reduced
from 275 MMBF to 260 MMBF for these two
reasons].
During
the period from 1979 to 1983, USFS officials began raising
concerns that sufficient timber could not be found on the
IPNF to meet the timber targets. "Ground-truthing" of timber
volumes for the preferred alternative revealed less timber
than anticipated. [See for example IPNF Planning
Document 1762, June 23, 1982, in which the "fall down" was
15 MMBF per year for the first decade]. Individual
ranger districts documented concerns about meeting timber
targets because of environmental impacts. On the Avery
Ranger District, officials expressed concern that the timber
target was "unrealistically high for the first decade due to
the number of drainages that exceed sediment levels that
would be entered." [IPNF Planning Document
1763]
On
the Bonners Ferry District, USFS officials raised concerns
about the impacts of timber activities on watersheds. The
importance of achieving the RPA goals for timber is
evidenced in the response:
If
we are going to meet our "RPA" goals, we will probably
have to enter some of these "high concern" watersheds. It
is, however, my contention that we can enter these
drainages without creating significant adverse impacts if
we are willing to take the necessary precautions.
[IPNF Planning Document 071, March 2,
1982]
On
the Priest Lake District, USFS officials provided the Forest
Supervisor with overlays showing constraints on a future
logging program resulting from past roading and logging on
Public and private timberlands, and from non-timber
resources (such as scenic beauty, critical wildlife
habitats, water quality, and fisheries). The ranger
concluded, "[A]s more and more restrictions are
placed on the timber management function, it becomes more
and more difficult to come up with sufficient viable sales
to meet targeted sell volumes." [IPNF Planning Document
1673 January 20, 1982]
On
January 19, 1983, the Assistant Secretary for Natural
Resources and Environment, John B. Crowell, Jr., directed
the Chief to change the standards of analysis for forest
plans nationwide. IPNF forest planners estimated this would
delay the release of the draft to the Public by 1.5-2 years.
[See IPNF Planning Documents 2039, 2040,
2042]
(2)
1983-1985: COMPLYING WITH DIRECTIVES FROM THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION
During
this period the RPA goal of 275 MMBF is central to the
development of the preferred alternative. In 1984 when USFS
planners began selecting a preferred alternative for the
IPNF under the Crowell directives, they again selected the
RPA target of 275 MMBF. Planners selected the goal of 275
MMBF, and provided as a rationale that this was the "IPNF
share of Regional target (RPA goal)." [IPNF Planning
Document 1740, April 9, appended documents. Note again the
impact of this timber target on other resources listed in
this document: reduced elk targets, reduced visual qualities
in north Idaho, and the minimum level of fish and water
quality protection to meet state standards. See also
Planning Document 1739, a summary of a USFS planning team
meeting on April 12, 1984, in which the decision was made to
use the 275 MMBF figure in a FORPLAN run of the preferred
alternative.]
"Ground-truthing"
the RPA-driven preferred alternative began in June, 1984.
[IPNF Planning Document 1733] By July 3, the USFS
had completed designating management areas for the proposed
forest plan. The Forest Supervisor directed district rangers
to meet on July 16,1984. At this meeting the rangers would
be assigned timber targets for their districts
(disaggregated from the overall IPNF timber target).
[IPNF
Planning Document 1668. This letter from the Forest
Supervisor also generally outlines the procedure for
"ground-truthing" each district.]
USFS
personnel at the ranger districts continued to communicate
their concerns to the supervisor's office about the timber
targets. On the Wallace District, the Ranger wrote in
February 6, 1984, that "Ground-truthing" showed significant
inaccuracies between FORPLAN and actual acres of mature and
immature sawtimber. As the ranger noted, "Needless-to-say
this drastically impacts the timber sell capability for the
district." [IPNF Planning Document 065] If the USFS
was to continue logging 61 MMBF each year from the Wallace
District, then immature sawtimber would have to comprise 36
MMBF of the total cut. Logging immature sawtimber would be
directly related to (1) capital investment funds to build
roads into roadless areas and (2) sufficient funds for
timber sale preparation--funding which would be unlikely.
Instead of 61 MMBF, the district ranger recommended a
maximum timber sell figure of 42 MMBF. This information was
presented to the Forest Supervisor, but neither he nor the
planning staff had any suggestions on how to address these
concerns in the forest plan. As the ranger noted,
"Discussions with planning team members has not resulted in
any quick, easy or perceptible way of accomplishing this.
The bottom line is our being in a position to support the
outcome and convey the true picture to the public."
[IPNF Planning Document 065]
In
July, 1984, USFS personnel on the Fernan Ranger District
wrote to the Forest Supervisor and enumerated the factors
which they believed would explain the significant
differences between the FORPLAN runs and "ground-truthing."
[IPNF Planning Document 1725, July 16,
1984]
The
USFS at the Priest Lake Ranger District also documented
significant differences between FORPLAN projected acres and
"ground-truthed" acres available for timber harvest. On the
Priest Lake District, watershed protection was the major
factor which constrained the timber program. District
personnel were "extremely uncomfortable" about the
relationship of a timber program to capital investment
monies for hard money roads: "Historically this district has
received no hard money for roads so those 4910 acres called
available in the ground truthing process are really
questionable." [IPNF Planning Document 1727, July 16,
1984]
In
the winter of 1985 the Forest Plan, based on RPA timber
targets, was reviewed by the Washington office of the USFS,
and officials in the U.S. Dept. of Agriculture. Only then
did the USFS release the Plan for Public review in April,
1985, a draft forest plan built around the USFS decision to
meet RPA timber targets.
(3)
1985-1986: RANGERS RECOMMEND 200 MMBF, THE USFS FORMULATES
THE FINAL PLAN AT 280 MMBF (250 MMBF ASQ)
Significant
changes between the draft forest plan and the final plan
require that the USFS submit a supplemental draft to the
Public for review and comment. The legal requirements of
such supplemental documents were outlined in an OGC (Office
of General Counsel, USDA) memorandum dated December 5, 1985.
Based on NEPA (40 C.F.R. 1502.9(c)), the USFS would be
required to develop a supplemental draft or final
environmental impact statement if: "(i) The agency makes
substantial changes in the proposed action that are relevant
to environmental concerns; or (ii) There are significant new
circumstances or information relevant to environmental
concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts."
[IPNF Planning Document 2884] New information did
emerge during this period and earlier periods that was never
fully disclosed to the Public: the USFS could not find the
timber to meet its RPA targets without :
- (1)
significant increases in budget;
- (2)
serious environmental trade-offs for fish, wildlife,
water quality, and outdoor recreation; and
- (3)
reductions in the overall value of timber in order to
meet these predetermined RPA timber targets. The concerns
of USFS officials about meeting timber targets are
apparent from the planning documents during this
period.
When
the USFS "ground-truthed" the ranger districts of the IPNF,
the agency found that it would have to sacrifice more and
more nontimber resources in order to maintain its overall
timber target. For example, the Avery District had to turn
to roadless areas and proposed wilderness areas as sources
of additional timber volumes. [IPNF Planning Document
1706, January 23, 1986]
The
USFS developed new roadless Management Area prescriptions to
allow logging in roadless areas. The federal agency
reassessed its earlier decisions about roading and logging
activities in already heavily impacted watersheds (called
"deferred drainages") trying to find timber volumes.
[For example, see letter from Mr. Chuck Prausa to the
Planning team dated January 24, 1986].
The
USFS was willing to sacrifice elk, fish, water quality,
scenic beauty, and outdoor recreation in order to maintain a
timber target at any cost. During the final months of 1985
the USFS reviewed Public comments and made recommendations
for developing the final plan. Regarding the IPNF timber
target, USFS officials developed recommendations which
included continuing efforts at "ground-truthing" based on
final plan objectives in order "to establish district
harvest levels and disaggregate final Forest Harvest
levels." [IPNF Planning Document 2944, undated, these
recommendations were submitted on December 17, 1985, as a
preliminary draft.]
On
January 24, 1986, the IPNF Management Team agreed on an
approach to develop a final forest plan. This included
developing a "ground-truthed" alternative with a timber
target of 325 MMBF. [IPNF Planning Document 2939. The
procedure for "ground-truthing" is found in a January 31,
1986, letter from G. Alcock, entitled "Ground Truthing
Process.] The initial targets for each district were:
- D-1
(Wallace) 69 MMBF;
- D-2
(Avery) 47 MMBF;
- D-3
(Fernan) 55 MMBF;
- D-4
(St. Maries) 34 MMBF;
- D-6
(Sandpoint) 38 MMBF;
- D-7
(Bonners) 42 MMBF;
- D-8
(Priest) 40 MMBF.
The
results of the "ground-truthing" in February, 1986, by the
districts revealed significant differences when comparing
the FORPLAN run and "ground-truthed" data. For example, on
D-1 (Wallace) the Aug. 1984 FORPLAN driven Programmed Sell
was 58.6 MMBF and the Feb. 1986 "ground-truthing" was 30.1
MMBF (a reduction of 28.5 MMBF). When comparing the number
of acres of regeneration harvest per year for the Wallace
District, FORPLAN recognized 2599 acres; yet the August 1984
"ground-truthing" revealed 2168 acres; and the February 1986
"ground-truthing," only 1628 acres. As noted by the
USFS:
From
these two displays it is obvious that there are some
major differences between the two efforts and the FORPLAN
model. . . . This difference alone can lead to a
significant reduction in harvest scheduled volumes. This
difference in volume per acre harvested suggests some
significant differences with FORPLAN yield
tables.
Watershed
and fisheries goals were the factors on all of the districts
which constrained the timber targets the most. [IPNF
Planning Document 1688, undated.]
198.3
MMBF was the overall programmed sell for the IPNF identified
by the ranger districts as a result of the "ground-truthing"
in February, 1986. The Sandpoint Ranger District, for
example, recommended a harvest level of 24 MMBF per year and
would still carry environmental risk:
This
level represents an 85% increase in harvest over 1984
target levels. This level would cut up to threshold
limits of watershed, spatial constraints or Forest Plan
recommended harvest percentage of mature and immature saw
timber.
[IPNF
Planning Document 1701]
[See
also IPNF Planning Document 1709 for additional data,
assessment, and conclusions from the Sandpoint Ranger
District.]
The
Avery District recommended the figures of 22.68 MMBF for the
first decade and 17.63 MMBF for the second decade, based on
the USFS's "ground-truthing." [IPNF Planning Document
1699 dated February 26, 1986. The timber volumes are
actually given as 226.8 MMBF first decade and 176.3 MMBF
second decade.] USFS officials then described the
impacts on economics, fish, wildlife, Old Growth, etc. in
trying to meet a timber goal on the Avery District of 47
MMBF.
On
the Wallace District, meeting a timber target of 69 MMBF
would result in reducing elk habitat potential from 54
percent under existing conditions down to 23 percent.
Virtually all watersheds (97 percent) would be at threshold
levels. Overcutting during the first decade would force a
reduction in timber targets from 69 MMBF (first decade) to
13.7 MMBF (second decade). Capital Investment monies would
be required in higher amounts to allow entry into stands
with lower volumes/acre. [IPNF Planning Document
1687]
The
USFS reaction to the results of its requested January 14,
1986, "ground-truthing" was two-fold. First, districts which
placed greater restrictions on logging in order to protect
water quality, fish, and elk were directed to bring their
districts into conformity with the other districts. And
second, another meeting was planned to increase the
districts' timber harvest schedule "within acceptable
limits." [IPNF Planning Document 1688, undated] The
USFS scheduled a meeting of district rangers and staff
officers for April 7 and 8 to undertake these changes.
[IPNF Planning Document 1689, dated March 25,
1986]
On
April 7, 1986, representatives from the Districts met with
USFS planners to discuss the results of the third
"ground-truthing" effort. The districts were instructed to
redo their maximum timber harvests using the following
constraints:
- (1)
40 acre harvest units;
- (2)
reduce visual quality as agreed upon at the January 24,
1986 meeting;
- (3)
reconsider management areas, including logging in
roadless areas where appropriate;
- (4)
maintain 5 percent Old Growth within Old Growth units,
but allow for no future allocation of Old
Growth;
- (5)
assess NDEF (non-declining even flow) through the second
decade;
- (6)
ignore timber sale economics, unless sale would never
sell anyway;
- (7)
for water quality, no thresholds would be established for
nonfishery streams.
After
the districts had complied with the above constraints, then
the districts were to look at relaxing concerns for
resources:
- (1)
visuals,
- (2)
roadless areas,
- (3)
timber sale economics,
- (4)
elk summer range and elk populations,
- (5)
timber volumes/acre, and
- (6)
watersheds and fisheries.
[IPNF
Planning Document 1711, dated April 8, 1986. In this
memorandum, the Fernan Ranger District shows how trade-offs
were done in order to achieve the desired result of
achieving the timber targets in the forest
plan.]
The
possible trade-offs the USFS is willing to consider in order
to reach its predetermined timber goals are found in several
sources. The Avery District submitted the "Avery Yellow
Paper." [IPNF Planning Document 1710, dated April 9,
1986] This enumerates the major trade-offs and
assumptions necessary to achieve higher timber targets,
including the impacts on elk, roadless areas, visual
qualities, and increased costs to the taxpayer.
The
Bonners Ferry District "found" additional timber volume in
grizzly bear habitat, uneconomic timber sales, and
unregulated products (eg. pulp). officials cautioned against
opening the Boulder and Katka Roadless Areas to roading and
logging because of the high cost of capital investment
outlays and risk of appeals. [IPNF Planning Document
1663]
Another
source for understanding the trade-offs the USFS is willing
to consider is the "Analysis of Potential Harvest Levels."
This document lists by ranger district the results of the
"ground-truthing" effort in February, 1986, and then with
the April 7 adjustments. Data is presented in tabular form
on the last page of this document, showing wide variation in
timber volumes for each district (but without the resource
trade-offs). The capital investment costs to carry out these
various timber programs are also presented in tabular form.
[IPNF Planning Document 1691, April 25,
1986]
On
April 30 and again on May 2, USFS planners met to find a way
to meet the RPA timber target of 275 MMBF. The USFS decided
on a programmed sell of 280 MMBF/yr consisting of 250
MMBF/yr ASQ and 25-30 MMBF/yr of unregulated timber volume.
[IPNF Planning Document 1690] In this document, the
USFS did not identify the consequences of these changes on
resource outputs. The USFS would enter roadless areas,
reduce water quality, reduce the visual resource, no longer
look at elk numbers but elk habitat, and sell smaller
diameter timber in order to maintain previous logging levels
[see also IPNF Planning Document 2933 and 2932]. 490
MMBF during the first decade would depend on $22 million in
capital investment funding. The USFS recommended that the
ranger districts have the following timber
targets:
- D-1
(Wallace): 54 MMBF (48 MMBF ASQ)
- D-2
(Avery): 45 MMBF (40 MMBF ASQ)
- D-3
(Fernan): 42 MMBF (37 MMBF ASQ)
- D-4
(St. Maries): 29 MMBF (26 MMBF ASQ)
- D-6
(Sandpoint): 31 MMBF (28 MMBF)
- D-7
(Bonners): 38 MMBF (34 MMBF ASQ)
- D-8
(Priest): 41 MMBF (37 MMBF ASQ).
USFS
planners met again on May 9, 1986, to review their
proposals. A summary of the key issues were then compiled in
a Regional Forester's Executive Summary dated June 4, which
was used in a presentation to the Regional Forester on June
4, 1986. [IPNF Planning Document 2014]
(4)
1986-1987: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION SHUTS DOWN FOREST
PLANNING IN IDAHO TO COMPLETE AN IDAHO TIMBER SUPPLY
ANALYSIS.
On
May 23, 1986, the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, Peter
C. Meyers directed the USFS to undertake an analysis of
timber supply in Idaho. This marked the second time that the
Reagan Administration halted forest planning on the
IPNF.
On
August 21, 1986, Senator James McClure held field hearings
in Coeur d'Alene on "community stability." The Forest
Supervisor of the IPNF was invited to present testimony
before Sen. McClure. [IPNF Planning Document
3934]
On
March 19, 1987, the Regional Forester was briefed on the
proposed f inal forest plan for the IPNF. The USFS
maintained its recommended timber target of 250 MMBF (ASQ),
but justified this number on the basis of historic sell
rather than as an attempt to meet an RPA target.
(5)
Sept. 17, 1987: THE REGIONAL FORESTER SIGNS THE RECORD OF
DECISION, THEREBY RELEASING THE USFS IS FINAL PLAN TO THE
PUBLIC.
On
Sept. 17, 1987, the Regional Forester signed the Record of
Decision for the IPNF forest plan, completing the USFS's
effort to produce a final forest plan for the
IPNF.
B.
USFS USED "TOP-DOWN" AND NOT "BOTTOM-UP" PLANNING IN
DETERMINING THE ASQ FOR THE IPNF, VIOLATING
NFMA.
The
USFS premised the planning process for the IPNF on achieving
a timber sell level of 275 MMBF/yr based on a RPA goal
(Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act, 16
U.S.C. 1601). With respect to timber resources the
legislative history of the NFMA clearly indicates that
Congress intended harvest levels to be determined by local
planning--from science, scholarship, and public process
(bottom-up planning) rather than from preconceived political
targets (top-down planning).
The
relationship between NFMA and RPA is perhaps best described
by the NFMA implementing regulations:
The
planning process is essentially an iterative process in
that the information from the forest level flows up to
the national level where in turn information in the RPA
Program flows back to the forest level. 36 C.F.R. Sec
219.4(a) (1984).
The
Resources Planning Act of 1974 does not impose top-down
planning on the individual National Forests and should not
have been used in this improper manner by the USFS as the
skeleton upon which to build the IPNF plan. The primary
purpose of the RPA is to improve funding to achieve "long-
and short-term goals for national forest use." [S. 2296,
93 Cong., 1st Sess., 119 Cong. Rec. 26,797 (1973), reprinted
in Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry,
96th Cong., 1st Sess, Compilation of the Forest and
Rangeland Renewable Resources Act of 1974, at 20].
An
RPA sponsor, Sen. Hubert Humphrey, noted that the Nixon
Administration budget proposed for the USFS was
shortsighted. In supporting RPA, Humphrey declared, "To
correct this deplorable condition, we must reform the budget
process. One-eyed bookkeepers must be gotten out of the
National Forests." [119 Cong. Rec. 26,797 (1973)
reprinted in RPA compilation at 20]
RPA
was designed to give the USFS budgetary leverage against
both the administration and Congress. As discussed by Sen.
Humphrey,
Dr.
McArdle [of the USFS] pointed out that the 1960
[Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act] was a clear
success as a basic policy tool, but a major omission was
the lack of a procedure to assure that the President and
Congress could secure the timely enactment of program
goals. Also missing was a vehicle for keeping before
policy makers an agenda to realize the program's goals.
This is [RPA's]
purpose.
120
Cong. Rec. 26,554 (1974) reprinted in RPA compilation at
209.
The
RPA requires the President to submit every five years a
Statement of Policy to be used in framing budget requests
for USFS activities and an explanation accompanying each
budget that does not request funds necessary to achieve the
objectives of the Statement of Policy. The purpose of the
RPA is to provide a standard for measuring the adequacy of
alternative budget proposals to meet long-term
goals.
Some
confusion has arisen surrounding Sec. 8(a) of the RPA which
mandates that the President, "subject to other actions of
Congress, carry out programs already established by law in
accordance with [the] Statement of Policy or any
subsequent amendment or modification thereof approved by the
Congress." 16 U.S.C. Sec 1606(a). Although uninterpreted by
any court, the Dept. of Agriculture's Office of General
Counsel (OGC) has issued two opinions construing this
language.
The
OGC issued its first opinion on April 8, 1982, and
stated:
It
is clear from RPA Sec. 8 that the Statement of Policy is
no more than a mechanism by which Congress evaluates
budget requests for Forest Service
activities.
[Memorandum
from Clarence W. Brizee, Ass't Gen. Counsel, Natural
Resources Division, OGC, U.S. Dept of Agriculture, to R.
Max Peterson, Chief, Forest Service].
The
OGC issued its second opinion on April 29, 1982. In the
second opinion the USFS had asked whether Section (8)
required local forest plans to meet the forty-one million
acre wilderness target of the 1980 revised Statement of
Policy. The reply distinguished between a wilderness
shortfall caused by changing national direction and a
shortfall resulting from cumulative recommendations of
individual forest plans. A change in national direction
probably would require Congressional approval, while
cumulative local planning decisions would require at most
only that the agency inform Congress of the
shortfall.
[T]he
Forest Supervisor is not prohibited from recommending,
nor is the Regional Forester obligated to disapprove, an
alternative which recommends less acreage for wilderness
designation that the assigned share of the wilderness
target [36 C.F.R. Sec. 219.5(i)]. Criteria for
choice of an alternative for adoption as a forest plan
may be based on numerous legal, economic, ecological,
technical, and public issue considerations in addition to
national and regional RPA policies and objectives [36
C.F.R. Sec. 219.5(c)]. If a forest's assigned share
of RPA wilderness targets cannot be met in accordance
with other considerations and objectives considered in
the forest planning process, readjustment of the assigned
share of the target is provided for (36 C.F.R. Sec.
219.4(b)(3)]. Memorandum from Clarence W. Brizee,
Asst Gen. Counsel, National Resources Division, OGC,
USDA, to Thomas E. Hamilton, Director, Resources Program
and Assessment, Forest Service, USDA.
As
with wilderness targets, forest plans are not required to
meet RPA timber targets. Congress did not intend for forest
planners to build forest plans around preconceived timber
targets. Yet this is precisely what the USFS did on the
Idaho Panhandle National Forests.
ISSUE
3. THE PLAN FAILS TO ADEQUATELY CONSIDER ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
OF LANDS, BELOW COST TIMBER SALES, AND ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS
IN THE DETERMINATION OF SUITABLE LANDS.
Contention
B-1
The
Forest Service justifies adding 223,360 acres to the timber
base where direct costs exceed direct benefits by claiming
other resources, such as wildlife and visual quality,
benefit from this decision. (ROD, p. 12 and USFS response p.
16) The agency, however, fails to disclose what these
benefits are, and whether they could be met by other method
(e.g., not logging, prescription burning, etc). The result
of the agency's approach is that the Forest Service places
itself in an untenable position of logging for scenic
beauty, logging for wildlife, and logging for clean water.
In the absence of timber sales, these expenditures for
wildlife and visual quality would not be needed.
The
reality is that the Forest Service decided to log and build
logging roads, damage the environment, and lose money--and
is now trying to justify this decision under the rubric of
"Multiple-Use."
See
also Exhibit 1. Randall O'Toole: Reply to Idaho Panhandle
Responsive Statement. June 20, 1989
ISSUE
4. THE PLAN ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY COST INEFFICIENCY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE BY USING "COMMUNITY
STABILITY."
The
timber economy in the Northwest is in a period of
accelerated transition resulting from factors beyond the
control of the USFS. These factors include corporate
overcutting, automation, cuts in workers' wages and
benefits, raw log exports and international economic
pressures.
The
Forest Service fails to:
- (1)
adequately define "community stability,"
- (2)
show how its forest plan for the Idaho Panhandle
stabilizes economies and social systems in the midst of
historic transition,
- (3)
whether this is appropriate, and
- (4)
whether there is any basis in law to do so.
ISSUE
5. THE PLAN FAILS TO ADDRESS CUMULATIVE IMPACTS.
The
USFS's position on cumulative impacts is as follows:
"Further site specific cumulative effects analysis will be
performed during the Forest Plan implementation." If the
USFS does not analyze the historic and anticipated impacts
of multiple site specific activities, then the agency's
position is deficient and in violation of NEPA and
NFMA.
The
SOR summarized several court rulings germane to the issue of
cumulative impacts. A recent ruling, Save the Yaak Comm.
v. Block, 840 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1988) reaffirms that
the Forest Service must address the issue of cumulative
impacts. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals writes in its
decision,
Both
connected actions and unrelated, but reasonably
foreseeable, future actions may result in cumulative
impacts. . . . The cumulative impact of
[road-building and logging] raises material
issues of fact concerning the project's effect upon the
human environment.
The
USFS has been willing to act on the problem of cumulative
impacts in checkerboard lands. For example on May 1, 1987,
the Supervisor of the Lolo National Forest withdrew two
proposed USFS timber sales and directed the ranger not to
plan any additional timber sales within the hydrologic
boundaries of three streams for ten years. This decision
argues
- (1)
that the USFS should withdraw timber sales in mixed
ownership watersheds such as occur on the St. Joe, and
- (2)
that sediment models can grossly underestimate actual
effects.
What
is especially frustrating for the appellants is that the
USFS on the IPNF is clearly aware of problems related to
mixed ownership generally and of the St. Joe checkerboard
lands specifically; yet the agency has done nothing to
remedy a serious and worsening environmental problem. This
is readily apparent upon reviewing the Planning
Documents.
On
June 19, 1979, the Avery District Ranger wrote to the Forest
Supervisor requesting that the agency address the
checkerboard land ownership problems in the forest plan.
Ranger Roy Brogden wrote:
Several
events over the last few days have suggested an item of
concern that should be covered by the Forest planning
process. In areas of intermingled ownership we regularly
face situations where the actions of the other
landowner(s) have had serious impacts on
resources.
The
USFS ranger noted that the only two options available for
the USFS were to mitigate (by reducing the logging and
roading on National Forest lands) or not to
mitigate.
The
ranger further stated:
I
would like to see land use planning address this issue. I
do not believe we can consider adjacent ownerships in the
elk coordinating guideline, allowable clearcut acreage
calculations for watershed, etc. without considering them
in calculating allowable
harvest.
[IPNF
Planning Document 0882]
The
Forest Supervisor responded to the Ranger by recommending
that he relay concerns about mixed ownerships to the USFS
planning team. The Forest Supervisor concluded:
Paragraph
"g" of Section 219.8 of the proposed section 6 NFMA
regulations addresses your concerns. We need to work with
state and other Federal agencies, as well as adjoining
landowners in coordination of planning
efforts.
[IPNF
Planning Document 4383, June 27, 1979]
Burlington
Northern Corporation, the owner of the checkerboard forests
on the St. Joe, submitted considerable comment about
intermingled ownerships and the forest planning process. On
February 1, 1980, the corporation noted,
Development
of the Forest Plan without the consideration of adjacent
management objectives could negate the effectiveness of
the management plan. [IPNF Planning Document
4382]
In
1980 Burlington Northern Corporation reviewed the draft
forest plan and DEIS for the Lolo National Forest in
Montana, and submitted its analysis to the USFS at the IPNF.
[IPNF Planning Document 3698] In 1982, the
corporation submitted to the IPNF Forest supervisor its
comments on the revised draft forest plan for the Lolo
National Forest. [IPNF Planning Document 3675, July 30,
1982]
The
USFS continued to be aware of the potential problems in the
checkerboard land, as evidenced by USFS efforts to exchange
lands with Burlington Northern Corporation. In a letter
dated November 10, 1980, from the USFS to Idaho Dept. of
Fish and Game, the Forest Supervisor states that the
Regional Forester directed that all land exchanges cease
until completion of the forest plans. Yet this same letter
raises concerns about the potential impacts to the
checkerboard forests of the St. Joe. As pertaining to
cumulative impacts and land adjustment to avoid such
impacts, the Supervisor said,
Our
Forest Plan, in conformance with Regional direction, will
consider and will provide overall direction and policies
regarding lands adjustment throughout the Forest. Our
current and long-standing direction in the St. Joe is to
consolidate ownership with Burlington Northern, but we
haven't been able to work out a satisfactory exchange
package with them. [IPNF Planning Document
0895]
USFS
planners decided on November 20, 1980, not to undertake
landownership adjustment planning as a part of FORPLAN. USFS
officials justified their decision on grounds of additional
cost and time. Yet planners also intended to develop
landownership alternatives as a part of the Forest Plan.
[IPNF Planning Document 0887. A similar intent by
planners to develop alternatives relating to Burlington
Northern Corporation is described in Document 0886, November
30, 1981, and Document 3682 November 16,
1982.]
USFS
officials were hampered by corporate unwillingness or
inability to provide information necessary for forest
planning. For example, in 1981, Mr. Bob Boeh representing
Burlington Northern Corporation said that his company was no
longer interested in pursuing a land exchange on the
Palouse. Mr. Boeh also declined to provide the USFS a copy
of Burlington Northern's land management plan and
information on timber volumes in the St. Joe checkerboard
forests. [IPNF Planning Document 0892]
USFS
officials have also been hampered in planning individual
activities which tier back to the Forest Plan, which fails
to address the problem of cumulative impacts. In assessing
impacts on elk for the Kelley-Blue Grouse Environmental
Assessment, USFS personnel wrote:
Burlington
Northern activities are not taken into effect because
they have not yet planned their activities out to that
year. . . . Some gates which were treated as locked for
this elk run could possibly be open if Burlington
Northern were to conduct logging operations, but at this
time it is not known where Burlington Northern will be
logging so all roads which are not designated as "open"
in the Area Closure were treated as closed. [At
3-4, Appendix C]
Discussion
with USFS planners confirms that these are not isolated
instances of problems obtaining information from timber
corporations for planning purposes. Yet the USFS responds to
the concerns of appellants by citing the overall Standard
for mixed ownership:
Where
other ownership comprises 25 percent or more of a major
drainage, coordination between owners is encouraged
through mutual participation. [Response, p.
24]
Such
a standard is meaningless if mutual participation does not
occur, as was the case in developing the Forest
Plan.
In
1982 the Avery District Ranger again wrote the Forest
Supervisor and asked that the problem of mixed ownership be
dealt with in formulating a preferred
alternative.
Once
again I would like to point out that in checkerboard
areas any realistic plan will have to make reductions in
predicted timber yields or allow for increased resource
impacts. [IPNF Planning Document 1775, March 30,
1982]
The
following day representatives from the Avery District
expressed concerns to USFS planners about visuals and water
quality:
On
mixed ownership area and checkerboard-forget visuals (or
downplay). Try to resolve watershed policy in
checkerboard. [IPNF Planning Document 1605, March
31, 1982]
The
Regional Forester noted deficiencies in the draft forest
plan for the IPNF, and communicated his concerns in a letter
dated March 8, 1983. He wrote,
It
does not appear the landownership planning criteria for
the checkerboard ownership areas is aligned with that
contained in FSM 5500, Region 1 Supplement No. 5. . . .
[T]he Forest Plan should be changed to be in
alignment with the Regional criteria. [IPNF
Planning Document 0861]
In
developing the final forest plan the USFS continued to have
input from the Avery District that the checkerboard forests
posed major problems. During "ground-truthing" in February,
1986, this was noted by USFS planning staff.
Changes
on the Avery District to MA-10, wilderness proposals and
MA6 and harvest on adjacent private lands (BN
liquidation) had a significant affect on their ability to
schedule timber harvest. [IPNF Planning Document
1696, dated March 19, 1989]
On
April 8, USFS planners directed the Avery District personnel
(and other districts) to find more timber volume for the
final forest plan. This resulted in a document entitled
"Avery 'Yellow' Paper: Ground Truthing Phase III."
The "Yellow Paper" lists the effects of the
Burlington Northern Corp. liquidation in the St. Joe
checkerboard forests for USFS planners:
Due
to accelerated harvesting, USFS is blocked out of
checkerboard ownership. Problems we foresee:
a.
fisheries (smolt potential) will be reduced below the
acceptable 80% level by BN harvest alone.
b.
insufficient hiding/thermal cover for elk will exist
on BN lands; FS will have to provide this habitat
requirement.
c.
harvesting on BN lands will not meet visual quality
objectives for the area
d.
difficulty scheduling harvest units so they will not
exceed 40 acre openings due to numerous openings
created by BN
e.
Forest Service ground will have to provide Old-growth
component
[IPNF
Planning Document 1710, April 9, 1986]
These
concerns were ignored by the USFS, and planners assigned the
Avery District a high timber target.
Additional
problems relating to mixed ownership are transportation
costs and fire. Planning document 0837, dated January 1981,
describe the increased costs facing the USFS because of
mixed ownership patterns. Burlington Northern Corporation
expressed concerns about transportation costs in its
comments submitted to the USFS on Feb. 1, 1980. [IPNF
Planning Document 4382] Concern about fire
related-problems resulting from inadequate slash disposal is
the subject of a memorandum from the Avery District to the
Supervisor's Office. [Letter dated June 10, 1987]
The USFS Plan does not assess the issue of mixed ownership
as it relates to either fire or transportation
problems.
ISSUE
6. THE PLAN IGNORES "QUALITY OF LIFE" WHILE ARBITRARILY
EXCLUDING THE 350,000 PEOPLE OF SPOKANE COUNTY AND FAILING
TO RECOGNIZE THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF NORTH IDAHO AND EASTERN
WASHINGTON.
A.
Some of the Plan's alternatives were recreation-based and
Spokane County residents are the major recreation users of
the forest.
The
Plan's decision to cleave off eastern Washington from the
impact zone is arbitrary and capricious. The USFS argues
that IPNF is not important to the larger Spokane economy.
Clearly this is inaccurate. Lakes and watersheds are central
to Spokane as a community. A significant number of Spokane
residents invest in north Idaho. Many men and women who hunt
and fish purchase licenses in Idaho, contributing to Idaho's
fish and wildlife economic sectors. The economies and social
fabric of north Idaho and eastern Washington are
inextricably intertwined.
B.
The socio-economic interconnectedness of north Idaho with
eastern Washington cannot be measured in the traditional
"input-output" economic model of the US Forest Service. This
model fails to assess "quality of life" as an economic
force, and many people live in Spokane and elsewhere because
of the high quality of living.
ISSUE
7. THE PLAN FAILS TO PROTECT WATER QUALITY AND
FISHERIES.
The
NFMA water quality provisions, which are historically
subsequent to, and more specific than section 208 of the
Clean Water Act of 1972, plainly supplement the Clean Water
Act requirements for lands within the National Forest
System. The Act prohibits timber harvesting unless the USFS
can ensure that "soil, slope, or other watershed conditions
will not be irreversibly damaged." [16 U.S.C. Sec
1604(g)(3)(E)(i)(1982)]
More
specifically, the agency must ensure that "protection is
provided for streams, streambanks, shorelines, lakes,
wetlands, and other bodies of water from detrimental changes
in water temperatures, blockages of water courses, and
deposits of sediment, where harvests are likely to seriously
and adversely affect water conditions or fish habitat."
[16 U.S.C. Sec 1604 (g) (3) (E) (iii)
(1982)].
Furthermore,
clearcutting is allowed only where "such cuts are carried
out in a manner consistent with the protection of soil,
watershed, fish, wildlife, recreation, aesthetic resources."
16 U.S.C. Sec 1604 (g) (3) (F) (v) (1982).
Protection
of water quality and beneficial uses is a major theme in the
history of the National Forest System, and is of paramount
importance in north Idaho. The Public watersheds of the
Idaho Panhandle National Forests are essential to the long
term health of lakes and streams in north Idaho. Protecting
municipal and domestic drinking water, nationally
significant fisheries, and the lakes of north Idaho are a
shared responsibility of the US Forest Service. A long
history of water quality devastation in this nation has led
to laws and implementing regulations that guide Public land
managers. The length of this section of the Reply reflects
the importance of clean water and fish in north Idaho--and
the failure of the USFS to protect these resources under its
Plan for the Idaho Panhandle.
(A)
THE USFS HAS NOT COMPLETED SOIL INVENTORIES, INCLUDING
IDENTIFYING HIGH HAZARD SOILS AND SLOPES.
Recognizing
that the NFMA "expresses strong concern about protecting
streams and lakes," (Final Report of the Committee of
Scientists, 44 Fed. Reg. at 26,626] the Committee of
Scientists addressed water quality at several places in the
NFMA regulations. This includes regulations that require
planners to compile information necessary to identify and
evaluate potentially hazardous watershed conditions, such as
unstable soils. [36 C.F.R. Sec 219.23(e)
(1984)]
The
Forest Service claims, in "Contention A" (Response p. 29),
that Land System inventories were used in the delineation of
capability areas and in the determination of suitable
timberlands. The Forest Service, however, just listed the
criteria used in defining capability areas. For landslides
the only category used is "erodibility" with two
sub-categories, "low to moderate and high". Lands which the
Forest Service terms "suitable timberland" have no mention
of being withdrawn from this category because of the
possibility of landslides occurring.
The
Forest Service fails to disclose to the Public that
landslides can and do occur on the Idaho Panhandle as a
result of the Forest Service. An example is the landslide
resulting from a logging road failure at Bluff Creek on the
Avery Ranger District in the spring of 1988, nearly
resulting in the loss of human life.
In
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assoc. v.
Peterson 795 F2d 688 (1986), the 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals held the Forest Service's Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) was inadequate because the statement did not
address (1) increased sedimentation and (2) cumulative
sedimentation effects on water quality arising from proposed
timberland construction projects.
In
order not to run afoul of this court decision, the Plan
should disclose any substantial risk of sedimentation caused
by road-caused landslides such as have occurred on Bluff
Creek in the Avery District. The Plan does not do so. The
9th Circuit Court said of landslides in
Peterson:
The
EISs do not, however, address increased sedimentation
contributed by road-caused landslides, because of the
difficulty inherent in predicting such slope failures.
Thus, the potential risks to water quality stemming from
the uncertainty in predicting landslides are ignored in
the 'discussion of sedimentation risks. These risks must
be revealed if they appear substantial. 795 F.2d at
696.
As
in Peterson, the FEIS of the Plan is inadequate
because it does not address the distinct possibility of
increased sedimentation and cumulative sedimentation effects
on water quality in the Idaho Panhandle arising from
landslides. Moreover, the Plan fails to disclose to the
Public information necessary to identify and evaluate
potentially hazardous watershed conditions, such as unstable
soils.
(B)
THE PLAN'S WATERSHED ANALYSIS IS INADEQUATE
Contention
B-1. Agency discretion threatens clean water and
fish.
The
Plan gives the USFS too much discretion in whether to
protect water and fishery resources. Unless addressed in the
Plan, the agency has no incentive to adequately plan for
watershed protection at any time, including at the project
level.
If
the USFS believes that stream surveys and sediment load
measurements are important components of the watershed
analysis procedure (as the agency's asserts on page 30 of
the response), then the agency should remove the qualifying
"if available" status and make them a watershed analysis
requirement.
The
Idaho Panhandle National Forests cover 2.5 million acres.
Geologies, slopes, and vegetative types are highly variable.
Using information of similar geology in the watershed
analysis is an unacceptable substitute for obtaining
detailed site-specific watershed information. If the
agency's cursory approach to watershed analysis was
acceptable, then it would logically follow that analysis of
one stream representing each geology would be sufficient to
manage the entire forest. This is clearly not the case.
Indeed, each drainage is geologically, hydrologically, and
vegetatively unique and deserves a complete site-specific
analysis to insure watershed protection.
The
agency conveniently picks and chooses what it wants to do
when it comes to watershed analysis. As a result, the Public
is denied critical information on potential watershed damage
and costs.
Contention
B-2. The Plan does not account for Cumulative
Impacts.
The
Forest Service's exhibit 7 (letter from Mr. Ed Javorka to
Potlatch Corporation dated Dec 2, 1980) is used as evidence
that the Forest Service did address the issue of cumulative
impacts to water quality. The agency does not acknowledge a
reply, or how information obtained was used to assess
cumulative impacts of multiple activities occurring in the
same watershed and forestwide, simultaneously and over time.
This information is not disclosed to the Public, and the
Public did not participate in a forest planning process that
addressed the issue of cumulative impacts, in violation of
NFMA and NEPA.
The
Forest Service argues that it will address cumulative
effects on a site specific level. But this approach defeats
the whole purpose of developing a plan which anticipates
cumulative effects of site specific activities on the area
covered by the Plan: stream watersheds and river basins. The
Plan does not look at the impact of multiple activities
(Forest Service and others) occurring simultaneously and
over time in a river basin. The USFS cannot adequately
assess cumulative impacts at the site-specific level, and
should assess cumulative impacts at the forest planning
level.
The
Plan should clearly spell out the agency's mechanism for
mandating the cooperation between State, private, and
federal agencies. Until then, "considering these
interrelationships" is not consistent with Forest Service
Manual (FSM) requirements that they "must" and "will"
coordinate and cooperate with landowners in areas of mixed
ownership to insure protection of downstream beneficial uses
in drainage basins.
An
adequate cumulative effects analysis procedure for drainage
basins should be applied to Idaho State Nutrient Management
Act requirements for developing basin-wide nutrient
management plans.
If
the USFS is unable to meet its historic commitment to
watershed protection for north Idaho's rivers and lakes that
are based on National Forests, then the agency should
clearly acknowledge this. Since the USFS has already so
badly damaged north Idaho's watersheds, the agency cannot
continue to do "business as usual" and meet it Public trust
responsibilities for maintaining and enhancing water
quality. The agency must address cumulative
effects.
Contention
B-3. Watershed Analysis was not used in scheduling
activities and fails to consider Peak Flows.
The
USFS did not respond to appellants contention (#3 on the top
of page 4) that the watershed analysis procedure does not
address the need to schedule forest activities to prevent
fishery/water quality impacts, as the agency's claim in the
Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) Page
VI-31.
Does
the agency really schedule road-building and logging
activities depending on the watershed analysis (flawed as it
is), as the agency asserts? If so, then where does the USFS
disclose this planning mechanism to the Public?
Peak
flows usually occur with spring run-off or unusual storm
events ("rain on snow" events). Clearcutting increases peak
water flows and sediment yields. Under the Plan for the
IPNF, most of future logging will be clearcutting. Huge
areas of north Idaho's forests have already been
clearcut.
Peak
flows probably account for the greatest amount of damage to
watersheds. Yet such events often occur when it is difficult
to have agency personnel in the field to monitor this
damage. The Public would reasonably conclude, therefore,
that the agency should clearly address the problem of peak
flows. The Forest Service, however, fails to do
this.
The
Forest Service responded to our concerns by stating that
"peak flows are considered important." Yet the agency
averaged these "peaks" into "daily" and "annual" sediment
and water yields. The result is that the Forest Service
fails to consider peak flow--the major contributor to
watershed damage--at the forest planning level.
The
agency uses vague language to suggest that it will consider
peak flows at the project level: "At the Forest Planning
level average annual yields are used, detailed analysis
which includes consideration of individual peak flows is
more useful at project level evaluations." (USFS Response,
at 30). Once again, the USFS plays a "shell game" with
Public resources: the Public never knows where or when this
federal agency does a watershed analysis which considers
peak flows. The Plan should specifically outline the
need/mechanism to address these variables at the project
level.
If
the Forest Service does address peak flows at the project
level but not in the Plan, then it fails to address the
problem of cumulative effects, as described
above.
Contention
B-4. The USFS Does Not Assess The Impacts On North Idaho's
Lakes.
The
Idaho Panhandle National Forests comprise most of the
watershed for many of north Idaho lakes. The Plan is the
legal document to which tiers all USFS decisions. Lakes are
a major issue. Hundreds of millions, perhaps billions of
dollars in property values depend on these lakes. These
lakes are a major part of the socio-economic life of the
Inland Northwest. The USFS Plan for the Idaho Panhandle
virtually ignores the lakes.
The
USFS should disclose the portion of damage it does to the
region's lakes. The agency should not wait for an invitation
from state government. Protection of the lakes is a shared,
cumulative-effects responsibility.
The
USFS attempts to dilute its responsibility for the
acceleration of lake aging process: cultural eutrophication.
The Forest Service declares that the lakes must be a "joint,
cooperative effort ... beyond the scope of the Forest Plan
alone."
The
agency should be willing and able to outline for the
relative state agencies, through the planning process, how
much sediment/nutrients will be deposited in the lakes from
agency activities, aside from of lawn fertilizer and septic
tank contributions.
What
assurance does the Forest Service give the Public that the
agency will not damage our lakes under this Plan? The Plan
does not contain adequate watershed analyses. The Plan fails
to address cumulative impacts.
The
Plan fails to address the issue of damage to lakes.
Ultimately, the Forest Service hides behind (1) shared
responsibility and (2) statements that lake protection is
beyond the scope of the Plan.
Contention
B-5. The Plan does not reveal how the watershed analysis
will be used to prevent further watershed damage, relying on
"Professional Judgment."
The
Plan should disclose to the Public the mechanism by which
the watershed analysis will be used at project level
activities. While "professional judgment" is a necessary
component of making decisions, the agency should explain how
it intends to use data collected through its watershed
analysis to prevent watershed damage.
In
an audit conducted by the Idaho Dept of Health and Welfare,
Division of Environmental Quality, (April 1988), four of ten
Forest Service projects reviewed in Idaho (including the
Idaho Panhandle) were judged to have unacceptable levels of
BMP implementation. According to this audit,
The
Central cause of the implementation problem was the
insufficient knowledge timber sale administrators had of
the Forest Practices Act and their obligation to
implement its rules to comply with the Clean Water Act.
[Water Quality Bureau. Final Report: Forest
Practices Water Quality Audit, 1988, at 2]
"Professional
judgment" depends on knowledge of the resources,
environmental consequences of actions taken, and
environmental law.
The
USFS's response is that it will meet its commitment to state
water quality standards. Evidence argues to the contrary. In
the Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare audit, Forest Service
personnel who plan and administer project level activities
are unaware of those state standards and pertinent
environmental law:
Four
of ten federal projects were judged by the team to have
an unacceptable level of BMP implementation. The main
deficiency identified is that personnel who are
responsible for planning and administering projects were
often insufficiently aware of the State's role in
administering nonpoint source sections of the Clean Water
Act. They were often unaware that the rules and
regulations of the Forest Practices Act are the BMPs
which provide minimum standards for compliance with the
Clean Water Act. Certain Forest Service specifications on
some forests are less restrictive than the BMPs, yet
federal specifications are applied by sale administrators
in the belief that they meet or exceed the BMPs. Another
implementation problem identified is the lack of a
mechanism by which a variance to the BMPS can be granted
to federal land managers. Although this is not an
impediment to BMP compliance, an administrative remedy
for this problem should be developed. [Water
Quality Bureau. Final Report: Forest Practices Water
Quality Audit, 1988 15-16]
With
the tremendous amount of watershed damage that already
exists, and the high ASQ and levels of road-building chosen
by the Forest Service, "professional judgment" gives no
solace to the Public that the Plan sanctions little more
than business as usual: more roads, more clearcutting, more
watershed damage.
Professional
judgment is properly understood as a type of judgement that
comes about when the experienced resource specialist gathers
all current information related to the management concern
and then compares it to the question at hand. The specialist
then bridges the gap between the diversely related studies
and the issue in question with a construction of
logically-based premises and personal experience. Problems
arise during the review process when the exact logical
premises and hunches used as building blocks are not
specified. When the Plan states that certain management
decisions were determined by a review of current literature
and professional judgement, and says no more, then those
decisions are effectively removed from scrutiny and debate.
It is imperative that when professional judgement is
employed the exact processes and assumptions should be
clearly and unequivocally presented for review and
study.
NEPA
[42 U.S.C. Sec 4332(c)] requires that the
environmental effects of the Plan must be addressed and
disclosed. Any decision to adopt the Plan must demonstrate
consideration of factually correct information, which must
be understandably disclosed in the Record of Decision and
its attendant documents. The Decision to adopt the Plan
itself must also be based upon factually correct and clearly
displayed information. The NEPA regulations require that an
EIS display scientific integrity:
Methodology
and scientific accuracy. Agencies shall insure the
professional integrity, including scientific integrity,
of the discussions and analyses in environmental impact
statements. They shall identify any methodologies used
and shall make explicit reference by footnote to the
scientific and other sources relied upon for conclusions
in the statement. An agency may place discussion of
methodology in an
appendix.
40
C.F.R. 1502.24
The
scientific integrity requirement is particularly important
in the key section on environmental consequences which
"forms the scientific and analytical basis for comparisons"
of alternatives. 40 C.F.R. 1502.16
The
Plan is not based on the scholarship and science required by
NEPA. The watershed analysis is just one example of this.
The documents that comprise the Plan would not withstand
peer review by the scientific community. Instead, the Forest
Service falls back on "professional judgment."
Contention
C. LOGGING AND ROADING STREAMSIDES
In
developing the implementing regulations for NFMA, the
Committee of Scientists considered riparian areas to be "an
extremely important fraction of the forest area." [Final
Report of the Committee of Scientists, 44 Fed. Reg. (1979)
at 26,626] Planners must give "special attention" to
riparian areas, strips of land "approximately 100 feet from
the edges of all perennial streams, lakes, and other bodies
of water." [36 C.F.R. Sec 219.27(e)]. While the
regulations do not specifically prohibit any activity in
riparian areas, the Committee hoped to "assure intensive
planning" and "provide further safeguards for protection of
soil and water at the critical meeting zone of the two
resources." (Final Report of the Committee of
Scientists, 26,653]
A
general reply to the Forest Service's response on the
agency's riparian management scheme will be followed by
point by point replies to the USFS responsive
statement.
GENERAL
REPLY: LOGGING AND ROADING STREAMSIDES
Preventing
damage to streams will be less costly and will have greater
Public benefits than trying to correct damage once it is
done. Mitigation of impacts as defined by the IPNF only
involves minimizing impacts or correcting an impact (after
the degradation occurs) by repair or rehabilitation methods.
Best management practices (BMPs) and Forest Plan standards
and guidelines are specifically aimed at lessening or
minimizing impacts, not avoiding impacts. NEPA regulations
(40 CFR 1508.20(a)) define mitigation to include total
avoidance of the impact by eliminating or limiting an
unfavorable action.
BMPs
by definition are purported to be the "best" mitigation
practices available, along with state-of-the art techniques
intended to protect water quality and riparian habitat. In
reality, many BMPs are rather standardized methods developed
for average conditions. Many are compromise practices that
must be economically feasible or proven to be cost-effective
before they are approved for use in the field.
The
effectiveness of many BMPs is untested in severe soil
stability or highly erosive situations. BMPs developed for
"lowland" areas may not work for roads and timber sales that
are planned for headwater areas with shallow soils and steep
slopes. Quantitative predictions of BMP success on these
more fragile sites will be difficult, and administrators
will be forced to accept high failure rates. An ability to
quantify the effectiveness of BMPs in all but a few limited
research situations casts a strong shadow of doubt on the
USFS's ability to assure that stream habitats and water
quality will be maintained and enhanced.
It
is common knowledge that BMP effectiveness in respect to
sediment, slumping and erosion from road construction is
highly variable and difficult to predict. Physical stability
factors of road cuts on steep mountain slopes are often
hidden from view until contracts are committed and
construction is underway. Springs, impermeable layers of
till or clay and rock formations often create instability
that cannot be engineered away or mitigated by standard
BMPs. One plugged culvert caused by inattentive maintenance
or a "one in 20 year" storm event can divert millions of
gallons of water over a roadway fill, resulting in sheet
erosion, massive slumps and mudslides that commonly are
deposited into first of second order streams. Total
dependence on BMPs and riparian guideline to accomplish the
"maintain or enhance" riparian goal is unrealistic, flawed
and doomed to eventual failure.
The
use of long timber management rotations to "maintain or
enhance" riparian habitat and water quality is an illusion
unless the rotation age approaches those found in Old Growth
riparian stands, and true selective harvesting occurs. It is
common in north Idaho's wet draws and streamside zones for
both seral and climax tree species to survive to ages of
300, 400, 500 years or more. Loss of individual trees from a
stand on these lengthy cycles are natural events that could
be simulated by innovative timber prescriptions. Instead,
the USFS offers 180-200 year riparian rotations that
terminate by clearcutting large tracts of riparian habitat
(and many acres of adjoining mountain sides). That is not
the way a new riparian stand begins naturally; such
prescriptions may produce commercial timber by the most
economic means but be doomed to failure in respect to water
quality protection.
The
USFS persists in timber management prescriptions for the
Idaho Panhandle which are dominated by even-aged methods and
clearcutting in the riparian zone in spite of the example
shown by adjacent forests. The USFS in R-1, R-4, and R-6
(including the adjacent Colville which shares administration
of the Kaniksu National Forest) has either removed the
riparian habitat from the suitable timber land base or
permitted only selective cutting methods. The Nez Perce and
Payette Forest Plans emphasize selective cutting over
clearcutting; the Colville Plan almost totally restricts the
riparian habitat to selective harvest methods. The Caribou
and Salmon National Forest Plans totally remove the riparian
zone from the suitable land base. The USFS's Plan for the
Idaho Panhandle is almost unique in its persistence in using
"traditional" even-aged, clearcutting prescriptions in
riparian areas.
Undoubtedly
the most negative riparian impact that can be foreseen in
the IPNF forest plan is road construction. It is accepted
that roads and stream crossing cannot be totally excluded
from riparian habitats without almost total exclusion of
commercial logging from the forest. Unfortunately there is
no discernible difference in the planned density of roads in
the IPNF riparian areas as compared with the adjacent
timber-emphasis upland management areas. A Forest Plan
statement that directs administrators to limit new riparian
area roads to where "there are no reasonable alternatives"
is meaningless in steep mountain terrain where there rarely
are "reasonable alternatives."
The
USFS's previous fishery biologist is on record stating that
buffer strips (no cutting) remain the most viable option for
riparian zone
management where fishery, wildlife and water quality
objectives cannot be assured. Use of standardized BMPs and
180 year old rotations do not provide adequate assurance.
According to this specialist, buffer strips are the
preferred approach along larger streams where taller (older)
trees are needed to reach and cross streambeds for LOM
recruitment.
Although
the Forest Plan Map does show riparian habitat as a system
of interconnected corridors, the means to actually manage
these corridors as an integrated system are not evident in
the USFS plan for the IPNF. Multiple activities occurring in
riparian zones over space and time will undermine the USFS's
best intentions. One slip of a bulldozer will undo the best
laid plans of the USFS, perhaps in an entire
drainage.
The
USFS will need to assess cumulative impacts of multiple
activities occurring in a watershed. Yet, no methodology
exists for measuring and factoring in cumulative impacts of
multiple activities within one drainage system. Quantitative
information on BMP effectiveness is scarce or
nonexistent.
The
USFS may have the best of intentions in respect to managing
riparian habitats, but the Forest Plan and its very limited
monitoring plan do not provide the NFMA required assurance
that these special areas and water quality will be truly
"maintained or improved" if water quality and fish habitat
protection are to be guaranteed over the long term, the
strongest case can be made for unsuitable timber
classification for most riparian habitats, with a flexible
management prescription that permits timber cutting when and
if needed for log recruitment, fisheries improvement or
riparian-dependent wildlife habitat enhancement.
SPECIFIC
REPLIES: LOGGING AND ROADING RIPARIAN ZONES
Contention
C-1 THE USFS INADEQUATELY PROTECTS RIPARIAN
ZONES
The
USFS claims that logging riparian zones will "maintain or
enhance" riparian dependent resources. As discussed above
under the scientific integrity requirements of NEPA, the
USFS must support its broad, sweeping claims with "explicit
reference by footnote to the scientific and other sources
relied upon for conclusion." (40 C.F.R. 1502.24)
The
USFS response claims that "rotations are timber harvesting
tools that may be used to meet overall riparian objectives."
The agency further asserts that "the combination of these
standards, guidelines, and monitoring should
[emphasis added] protect watershed and riparian
values."
Terms
such as "may" and "should" do not meet stringent NFMA
requirements that forest planning "shall
[emphasis added] provide special attention to areas
dominated by riparian vegetation" and the FEIS (at VI-36)
claim that "timber cannot be harvested without enhancing or
maintaining riparian dependent resources." The term "shall"
as it appears in national legislation is a command. It does
not allow for permissive application of theories that may or
may not be correct. The burden is on the USFS to demonstrate
that its Plan meets the federal legislation requirements.
This burden has not been met.
The
agency tries to reassure the Public that it will take into
account existing riparian conditions "during project
implementation of the prescription standards and
guidelines." [At 32 of response]. The agency does
not reveal the details of how it will "take into account"
these existing conditions.
The
Plan's riparian management scheme ignores existing
conditions such as prior damage from clearcutting or
road-building. When the Idaho Department of Fish and Game
expressed concern about this, the USFS's response was based
primarily on professional judgement:
Agree
that the riparian analysis technique used in the Plan is
an oversimplification, however I don't believe
[emphasis added] the results would change
appreciably if we were to include the site specific data
on harvested acres and road encroachment. The results
would still reflect that buffer strips are better than
100 year rotations and 5% harvest levels are better than
buffer strips." (See SOR Appendix E, page C-1)
The
agency contradicts itself on the issue of whether it
considered existing riparian conditions when developing the
Plan. In the above response to the Idaho Dept. of Fish and
Game site-specific data were not used. But in the USFS's
response to appellants' SOR, "existing watershed conditions
were considered in the development of the Forest Plan".
[Response at 32]
Exhibit
7 addresses overall watershed conditions, but does not refer
specifically to riparian conditions. The exhibit does not
provide inventories of watershed conditions, analysis of
these inventories, and application of this analysis to the
overall planning process.
Exhibit
9 has nothing to do with existing riparian conditions. The
exhibit is limited to a review of the sediment model by
inspections of select drainages over sediment thresholds.
Neither exhibit 7 nor exhibit 9 address the issue of whether
the USFS considered existing riparian conditions in the
Plan.
If
the USFS chooses to defer its assessment of riparian zones
to the project level, then it fails to address the
cumulative impacts of past and future activities on riparian
zones. Appellants argue in the SOR for the agency to look at
the "big picture" of watersheds, a holistic view:
The
riparian corridor needs to be managed as a unit or system
of interconnected drainages. Section 2502.1 of the FSM
states that "The stream environment and related National
Forest System lands and resources shall be considered as
a unit... ". Standards for headwater streams should be as
high, if not higher than their downstream counterparts
because of cumulative effects potential, percentage of
spawning sites, and higher elevation/runoff
relationships." (SOR Appendix E, at 7)
Deferring
riparian assessment to the project level misses the
interconnectedness of watershed units.
The
USFS has written its riparian management program without
first completing inventories of existing riparian
conditions, without providing scientific documentation
supporting the agency's riparian scheme, and without
disclosing the impacts of the Plan on riparian resources-all
in violation of NEPA. In an attempt to correct this, the
USFS argues that existing conditions will be assessed at the
project level. This, also, is insufficient under
NEPA.
The
USFS does not give equitable treatment to water resources
and timber resources. The USFS selects an ASQ of 280 mmbf
for an overall forest plan. The USFS, however, postpones its
"goals" for riparian zones to site-specific planning. The
agency's failure to assess watershed management ultimately
flaws the timber programl since timber and water resources
are inextricably linked. In the final analysis, the best way
to protect riparian resources is to prevent the damage from
occurring. The USFS should remove riparian zones from the
timber base.
Contention
C-2 NO PROTECTION FOR HEADWATER STREAMS
The
USFS claims in their C-2 response that "hard and fast rules
cannot be made to cover all situations. At the Forest Plan
level, there needs to be flexibility for on-the-ground
situations."
The
Forest Service has a history of "flexibility" in the
Public's watersheds. The result for the Public watersheds of
north Idaho is a massive and expanding road network with
major water quality impacts. Maintaining agency
"flexibility" in protecting water quality runs contrary to
NFMA, which is restrictive. As discussed by Wilkinson and
Anderson:
The
controversy over the effects of timber harvesting on
water quality provided a major impetus for adoption of
the Church guidelines and the National Forest Management
Act (NFMA). As a result, some of the NFMA's most
prescriptive provisions concern water quality. The Act
prohibits timber harvesting unless the Forest service can
ensure that "soil, slope, or other watershed conditions
will not be irreversibly damaged." [16 U.S.C. Sec
1604(g)(3)(E)(i)(1982)]
More
specifically, the agency must ensure that "protection is
provided for streams, streambanks, shorelines, lakes,
wetlands, and other bodies of water from detrimental
changes in water temperatures, blockages of water
courses, and deposits of sediment, where harvests are
likely to seriously and adversely affect water conditions
or fish habitat.[16 U.S.C. Sec 1604
(g)(3)(E)(iii) (1982)] Furthermore, clearcutting
is allowed only where "such cuts are carried out in a
manner consistent with the protection of soil, watershed,
fish, wildlife, recreation, aesthetic resources."
[16 U.S.C. Sec 1604
(g)(3)(F)(v)]
[64
Or. L. Rev. 1, 158 (1985) at 222,223]
Taken
as a whole, NFMA requires the USFS to take strong measures
to protect water quality and fisheries. The planning record
for the Idaho Panhandle is replete with evidence of serious
and worsening impacts to water quality and fish. The agency
should take steps in the Forest Plan to protect water
quality. The Forest Service's response on the issues of
protecting headwater streams and of protecting riparian
resources is inappropriate in the face of the history of the
National Forest System, the legislative history of NFMA, and
NFMA itself.
Contention C-3
THE PLAN PROVIDES NO ASSURANCE THAT THE RIPARIAN
PRESCRIPTION WILL MEET STATE AND FEDERAL WATER QUALITY
STANDARDS, AND THAT THE PRESCRIPTIONS WILL SATISFY THE 80%
FRY EMERGENCE STANDARDS FOR FISHERY STREAMS.
The
USFS claims that "riparian prescriptions were based on best
available scientific knowledge" and "monitoring will check
on the adequacy of the water quality and fishery standards."
[Response at 32, 33]
Clearcutting
streamsides (and logging in riparian zones generally) may be
based on the "best available scientific knowledge," but this
claim is not supported by enumerations of the scientific
literature on riparian zones. The USFS's riparian scheme for
the Idaho Panhandle would not likely withstand peer review
by the scientific community.
The
USFS attempts to assure the Public that logging streamsides
is okay because "monitoring" will occur. This response
raises several unanswered questions:
- (1)
Assuming that monitoring occurs that is both sensitive
and specific, monitoring will only show that damage has
already occurred after it is too late--not unlike closing
the barn door after the cattle are already out of the
barn. How is the problem detected before damage is done?
- (2)
Much of the damage to streams occurs during periods of
peak flows--which are difficult to monitor. What
protection will be provided for peak flows?
- (3)
the cost for monitoring that is thorough and
statistically significant will be high, and funding will
be unlikely. Will funding be assured?
- (4)
Since the Plan does not contain a monitoring Plan
amendment anyway, how does the Public ever know whether
the "best available scientific knowledge" was adequate to
enhance or improve riparian dependent resources and meet
fishery or water quality standards? Once the USFS
completes a water quality monitoring amendment, how does
the agency intend to provide Public review?
These
unanswered questions negate the effort by the USFS to assure
the Public that damage will not occur to riparian
zones.
Contention
D. NO ASSURANCE IS GIVEN THAT FOREST FISHERIES WILL BE
MAINTAINED AND IMPROVED TO MEET FEDERAL STANDARDS AND FOREST
PLAN OBJECTIVES.
The
implementing regulations for NFMA require that the USFS
manage fish habitat to maintain viable populations of all
existing native vertebrate species. 36 C.F.R. Sec. 219.19
(1984). A Forest Plan must ensure protection from timber
harvesting that will "seriously and adversely affect water
conditions or fish habitat." 16 U.S.C. Sec
1604(g)(3)(E)(iii)(1982) The NFMA water quality provisions,
which are subsequent to, and more specific than section 208
of the Clean Water Act of 1972, plainly supplement the Clean
Water Act requirements for lands within the National Forest
System.
The
USFS asserts that the "Forest Plan Standards are designed to
maintain the existing beneficial use of water."
[Responsive Statement at 32] The agency does not
support this claim, failing to provide assurance to the
Public. The modeling, procedures, and standards do not
assure that forest fisheries will be maintained and
improved, especially with increased fishing
pressure.
One
case example is the fate of the national class trout fishery
of the St. Joe River. The USFS and other agencies are
improving Public access along the river road. Meanwhile, an
aggressive logging and roading program in the watersheds
will likely damage and destroy fish habitat. The USFS has
extensively logged Quartz Creek, Gold Creek, Bruin Creek,
Bird Creek, Tumbledown Creek, and other watersheds on the
north side of the St. Joe. Meanwhile, Plum Creek Timber
Company is liquidating its checkerboard forests on the south
shore of the St. Joe River.
The
USFS also fails to support the statistical reliability of
the fishery data and model. In addition the agency fails to
consider the problems of variability for use as an indicator
of fry emergence and fishery conditions. The fishery model
fails to include increasing amounts of fishing pressure and
past damage to fish habitat. Fisheries are destroyed by
- (1)
increased fishing pressure and
- (2)
damaged fishery habitat. Road building and logging have
extensively damaged fishery habitat on the IPNF, and
fishery pressures are expected to increase.
Yet
the fishery model fails to reflect this reality.
The
USFS implies that the responsibility for fisheries lies with
other agencies:
The
Forest Plan Standards are designed to maintain the
existing fisheries beneficial use of water. Fishing
pressure also has a large impact on the fisheries
resource, however fishing regulations are under the
jurisdiction of the State of Idaho. [Response at
33]
The
USFS is entrusted with fisheries habitat, which is
inextricably linked with fish populations. The linkage
between habitat and fish populations requires close
cooperation between fishermen, the Idaho Dept. of Fish and
Game, the Idaho Dept. of Health of Welfare, the Washington
Dept. of Wildlife, and other state and federal agencies that
share responsibility for the Public's fisheries. The USFS
should have fully disclosed the trade-offs to the fishery
resources of north Idaho and eastern Washington in its
planning documents, and developed alternatives with a full
spectrum of fishery goals as the USFS did with timber
goals.
The
USFS response states that cutthroat egg survival methods
were developed in 1985. This is two years prior to the
completion of the final forest plan--sufficient time to
readjust the agency's forest plan.
The
USFS does not respond to the appellants contention that
over-wintering survival and rearing habitat should have been
used as indicators in the fishery model to calculate fishery
populations. While no mention of these indicators occurs in
the model, the USFS does mention rearing habitat in the
EIS:
.
. . in many streams, rearing habitat appears to be a
greater limiting factor than spawning habitat.
[FEIS VI-42]
.
. . [r]esearch indicates that sediment may reduce
overwinter survival. [FEIS VI-28]
The
USFS's response is inadequate, even when compared with the
agency's concerns expressed in the FEIS.
The
USFS failed to respond to the contention by appellants that
the fishery model is statistically unreliable. Appellants
have discussed elsewhere in this reply requirements under
NEPA for scientific integrity. As noted in the Statement of
Reasons:
Despite
the indication that the IPNF might be using the best
information available and a potentially useful fishery
model, there is no assurance that forest fisheries will
be maintained and improved to meet federal standards and
Plan objectives. [Appeal #2130, appendix E, Page
9]
In
sum, increasing public access is combining with ongoing
damage of watersheds and fish habitat. The Forest Plan is
silent on the combined effects of increased public pressure
and habitat destruction. The Plan certainly does not assure
the Public that the Forest Service will protect fisheries.
Instead, the Plan simply passes the issue on to the ranger
districts. The Public is left with a "Plan to do more
planning," a "shell game situation," and no assurance that
the Forest Service will actually protect water quality and
fish.
Contention
E. THE SEDIMENT MODEL IS INADEQUATE.
The
USFS states that the agency's models were "based on the best
available information." [Response at 34] As this
relates to sediment, however, the USFS developed a model
that did not include bedload sediment. And yet "best
available information" readily available through
hydrologists and fisheries biologists would have underscored
the importance of bedload in overall watershed
health.
The
USFS was itself aware of the problem with bedload. Bedload
sediment was brought to the agency's attention by
appellants:
From
limited bedload sampling we have found that bedload
represents 25 to 39 percent of the total sediment load in
developed drainages and only 5 percent in undeveloped
drainages. Thus be restricting our sampling to only
suspended sediment we are underestimating total sediment
by 61 to 75 percent in developed drainages.
[Idaho Panhandle National Forests: Draft Water
Quality Monitoring Program, Forest Plan Phase as
submitted by USFS hydrology staff, Robert Embry, SOR
Appendix E-1]
The
USFS argues that appellants' concerns about models are
beyond the scope of the forest plan, and these concerns will
be addressed at the project level. The USFS, however,
provides no assurance that analysis will take place at the
project level (the "shell game" planning phenomenon).
Furthermore, watersheds are ecologic units and poorly
understood from the perspective of the USFS's individual
projects. For further discussion of this issue, the USFS
should refer back to issue #5 on cumulative
effects.
Contention
E-2. THE USFS SEDIMENT MODEL DOES NOT ACCOUNT FOR TIME AFTER
AN ACTIVITY, AND THE USFS POSTPONES IMPORTANT ANALYSIS
OUTSIDE THE FOREST PLAN.
The
USFS argues that its sedimentation coefficients were based
on the best available research. Yet research information is
clearly available on the relationship between amount of
sediment delivered to streams and time following soil
disturbing activity. Such information was even provided to
the USFS by appellants in SOR Appendix E (F-1).
The
USFS is willing to quantify sedimentation rates, but is
unwilling to include landslides or mass failure hazards in
the agency's sediment model. Instead, the agency chooses to
defer this analysis to the project level where, again, no
assurance is provided to the Public that this will ever be
done.
Contention
G. THE PLAN FAILS TO MEET STATE WATER QUALITY AND DRINKING
WATER STANDARDS.
The
USFS claims in their response that "the Forest Plan does
meet State of Idaho Water Quality Standards." This is in
direct contradiction to the letter written by Al E. Murrey
(Director of the Idaho Water Quality Bureau), referenced in
Appendix H, which specifically states that "the Panhandle
Forest Plan is not in compliance with Idaho Water Quality
Standards."
The
USFS further claims that domestic watershed areas will be
"treated as areas of special needs," yet the agency fails to
detail the specifics of these treatments. It is not beyond
the scope of forest planning and FSM requirements to provide
forest-wide guidelines to protect drinking water sources.
Indeed, the USFS's failure to provide such guidelines is an
abrogation of the agency's responsibility.
Contention
H. ENTERING UNSCHEDULED DRAINAGES
Appendix
K in the SOR lists a series of resource activities planned
for "unscheduled" IPNF drainages. This list differs from
appendix G of the of the USFS Plan which lists only a
"couple of potential sales" [USFS Response at 36] in
the implementation schedule.
The
USFS justification for further activities in already heavily
impacted drainages remains unclear--other than the
assumption that more logging and roading will result in a
net benefit to damaged watersheds. The USFS admits that some
of these unscheduled drainages "will require up to 30 years
for potential recovery." [FEIS at VI-39] How does
the USFS justify these proposed activities?
The
USFS failed to answer our contention that the Plan does not
contain numeric or qualitative criteria for justifying the
agency's scheduling categories and determining stream
recovery times.
Contention
I. THE PLAN UNDERESTIMATES IMPACTS AND COSTS OF
ROAD-BUILDING AND LOGGING ON WATER AND FISH
RESOURCES.
The
issue of "roads" is key to understanding the problems and
opportunities facing water and fish resources in north
Idaho. The USFS's analysis of its road network on the Idaho
Panhandle is inadequate.
The
agency has not yet provided an inventory of the existing
road network (both maintained and unmaintained roads), and
based its Plan on the on-the-ground condition of the
inventoried road network. Landslides as exemplified by those
at Bluff Creek on the St. Joe National Forest are not
discussed. Culvert replacement and repair is not discussed.
The multiple factors of road maintenance that impact on
costs and the environment are not discussed.
Many
of the new road miles under this Plan will be in roadless
areas. These areas are relatively steeper and more remote.
Maintenance costs of road networks expanded into areas now
roadless will likely be proportionately higher. Yet no
mention of this is made in the Plan. Adding new mileage to
the road inventory should necessarily increase the amount of
road maintenance performed annually. Without an increase in
the road maintenance budget, current levels of maintenance
dollars will have to be stretched further to accommodate
these new roads. This approach guarantees that forest roads
will continue to be a primary source of nonpoint pollution
from National Forest lands.
The
USFS failed to respond to the contention that road closures
should only be used to justify additional activities in a
watershed when the hydrologic regime of the road returns to
normal (in 5-10 years). The agency relies heavily on road
closures for watershed protection, yet provides no assurance
to the Public that this will work (eg. scientific
literature, case examples from the Idaho Panhandle supported
by monitoring data, etc.).
Broad
sweeping promises about protecting water quality through
road closures is an inadequate response on a forest with
tremendous watershed impacts from a massive road
system.
The
USFS failed to respond to the contention on page 18
(Appendix E, SOR) that the decision-making processes
outlined in the Plan lack accountability and monitoring. The
Plan should outline an iterative decision-making process,
recognizing the problems and limits of relying on
"professional judgment." By failing to respond, the USFS
acknowledges this is a problem.
Contention
J. ABSENCE OF INTERIM PROTECTION FOR CANDIDATE RIVERS FOR
THE NATIONAL WILD AND SCENIC RIVERS SYSTEM.
The
USFS responds to the contention that management
prescriptions for candidate wild and scenic rivers should be
made explicit by asserting that any effort to protect these
rivers would be deferred to the project level. Again, the
USFS fails to provide detailed planning in the Forest Plan,
and defers another important issue.
Contention
K. THE PLAN IS NOW INADEQUATE BECAUSE OF THE NEW STATE OF
IDAHO WATER QUALITY REQUIREMENTS PERTAINING TO NON-POINT
SOURCES OF POLLUTION.
During
the planning period the issue of nonpoint sources of
pollution was an issue of tremendous Public interest and
involvement in Idaho. Nonpoint sources of pollution (such as
sediment from roads and logging, grazing, and mineral
activity which all occur on National Forest lands) was the
focus of two gubernatorial vetoes, numerous Public and
legislative hearings, and played a major role in Idaho's
1986 senatorial campaign.
The
State of Idaho recently reached an agreement on nonpoint
sources of water pollution in efforts to satisfy the
requirements of the federal Clean Water Act. Under the
recently completed agreement, the Public will participate in
identifying stream segments of concern (SSOC). The
designation of SSOC on National Forest land means that the
Forest Service will have to conduct intensive monitoring of
BMP implementation and effectiveness. The antidegradation
agreement states that the federal land management agency
shall monitor water quality on their own lands. In order for
the Plan for the Idaho Panhandle National Forests to comply
with the federal Clean Water Act, the Plan will need to be
revised and the agency willing to make a firm commitment to
the agreement and to monitoring SSOC. Failure to do so
places the Forest Plan in violation of the federal Clean
Water Act.
ISSUE
8. THE PLAN FAILS TO ADEQUATELY ASSESS THE IMPACT OF PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE MINERAL ACTIVITIES ON SURFACE
RESOURCES.
Contention
A. WITHDRAWAL OF LANDS FROM MINERAL ENTRY
The
USFS asserts that it has complied with 36 CFR 219.12(f) and
40 CFR 1502.14 regarding withdrawal of lands from mineral
entry or leasing by noting that lands designated
"wilderness" are withdrawn. The USFS does not discuss
withdrawal of nonwilderness lands such as lands along the
shorelines of Lake Pend Oreille and Priest Lake. Even
alternatives that designate higher percentages of roadless
areas as wilderness do not assess options for mineral
withdrawal on the 1.7 million acres of lands already roaded.
There can be no debate that mining will have impact and now
is the time to assess the impact forest-wide.
Contention
B. CONSIDERING THE IMPACT OF FUTURE MINERAL
DEVELOPMENT
The
USFS maintains that it has complied with planning
regulations which require the agency to consider mineral
exploration and development when planning the future of
renewable resources (36 C.F.R. 219.22).
In
north Idaho there is already a tremendous amount of mining
damage, toxic and heavy metal pollution, and logging-related
watershed damage. Any comprehensive long range planning
effort should carefully consider the separate and cumulative
impacts resulting from activities related to both renewable
and nonrenewable resources.
The
USFS offers Table 111-20 (FEIS 111-70) as evidence that it
is taking into consideration the effects of potential
mineral development. Yet this Table is entitled "IPNF
PREDICTED 5-YEAR MINERAL ACTIVITY" and the Forest Plan has a
life expectancy of 10-15 years. The Plan is silent as to
mineral development beyond the first 5 years.
The
Plan is also silent about existing damage to renewable
resources resulting from past mineral activities. No
discussion is provided about the potential interaction of
multiple activities, with resulting impacts on downstream
human health and economies.
ISSUE
9. THE PLAN FAILS TO SET FORTH AN ADEQUATE MONITORING
PROGRAM.
An
internal working paper on management indicator species (MIS)
and monitoring has recently been brought to public
attention. The IPNF Plan, according to USFS reviewers, lacks
any monitoring item to assess compliance with standards f or
snags. The "white paper" also notes that the IPNF plan
relies on the Idaho Dept of Fish and Game (IDFG) to monitor
pileated woodpeckers, but the IDFG doesn't monitor nongame
populations. Similar concerns and problems were noted
pertaining to Old Growth: no monitoring other than ties to
IDFG monitoring.
ISSUE
10. THE PLAN INADEQUATELY ASSESSES OLD GROWTH.
The
Plan's definition of Old Growth does not address elevation.
Lower elevation Old Growth is biologically more productive
than is higher elevation Old Growth. Lower elevation Old
Growth areas are generally more accessible than higher
areas, and have been more severely impacted by logging. The
varied elevations of Old Growth are not interchangeable. The
Plan's definition of Old Growth does not include criteria
for elevations. The result is that the Plan does not ensure
equitable distribution of Old Growth habitat and does not
meet its responsibilities under 36 C.F.R. sec.
219.26.
Contention
A. THE PLAN FAILS TO ADEQUATELY DISCUSS BIOLOGIC DIVERSITY
AND THE INVENTORY OF OLD GROWTH FOREST IS
INADEQUATE.
(1)
INVENTORY
The
Committee of Scientists placed heavy emphasis on
inventories. The Committee of Scientists was developed with
the help of the National Academy of Sciences and the
Secretary of Agriculture to developing the implementing
regulations for NFMA. These regulations require that in
providing for diversity of plant and animal communities,
"inventories shall include quantitative data making possible
the evaluation of diversity in terms of its prior and
present condition." (36 C.F.R. Sec 219.26 (1984)) The
Committee explained, "No plan is better than the resource
inventory data that support it. Each forest plan should be
based on sound, detailed inventories of soils, vegetation,
water resources, wildlife, and the other resources to be
managed." [Comm of Scientists Final Report, 44
Fed. Reg. 26,608 (1979)]
Land
managers must know what the Public resources are before they
make decisions. In the planning process, inventories are
fundamental. The Panhandle Plan is disturbingly deficient in
its inventory of many resources, including Old
Growth.
The
USFS's response to the appellants' contention of inadequate
review, discussion and resolution of the old Growth issue
(and genetic diversity) reveals nothing new or definitive.
Presumably this minimal response has its basis in an FEIS
and Forest Plan that is so disturbingly weak in dealing with
the Old Growth issue that nothing could be added except to
rehash a few references and generalizations.
The
planning records clearly show (and the Forest service openly
admits) the inadequate and cursory "old growth" inventory
used in the Forest Plan development. A definition of "Old
Growth" had not been developed during the planning
process--in fact, such a definition is still in the
development stage. Yet the Forest Service continues to log
this increasingly scarce and important Public
resource.
During
the past year there have been additional old Growth
developments and Forest direction that are not discussed or
even referenced in the Responsive Statement. Citizen
involvement in area planning efforts on the Priest Lake
Ranger District during the fall and winter of 1988-1989
convinced the new district ranger that the Old Growth issue
needed careful review and better field information before
several hundred acres of existing old Growth could be
scheduled for logging. The ranger has agreed to a moratorium
on cutting or development of extensive Old Growth stands
pending more information and future Public
involvement.
This
district is currently leading the Idaho Panhandle in a
cooperative old Growth inventory, with involvement of
citizens and Region 1 wildlife, timber, and ecology
specialists. One goal of this ongoing effort is to establish
a forest-wide Old Growth definition and specific inventory
criteria. Presumably the results of the work on this ranger
district will provide direction, standards and guidelines
for the remaining districts on the Panhandle National
Forests, and possibly other forests in Region 1 of the USFS.
This effort should be integrated into the entire
Plan.
The
Forest Service has made no Public commitment to extend the
Priest Lake's inventory effort to the other ranger
districts. Current indications are that a forest-wide
accurate Old Growth data base may not be available for 4-5
years or more.
Disturbing
revelations on Old Growth inventory data from Region 6
during the past year add to our uneasiness about Old Growth
management and protection on the Panhandle National
Forests--and all of Region 1. Clearly the preliminary Old
Growth figures used in Region 6 Forest Plans were
disturbingly overblown--that is, existing Old Growth acres
are markedly less than first estimated by the USFS. Why
should appellants believe the situation on the Panhandle
National Forests is different? What if future inventories
show only 150,000--200,000 acres of "real" Old Growth,
instead of 273,000 acres in the Plan, and in the interim we
have locked in several thousand acres of these irreplaceable
trees into signed timber sale contracts?
(2)
IMMINENT THREAT OF LOGGING
In
spite of the candid acknowledgement that the USFS is
attempting to "manage and preserve" a threatened, vital
resource without basic inventory data, most of the Panhandle
Forests' Old Growth remains in the timber base. Timber sales
containing these remnant stands are under scrutiny and
harvest preparation daily throughout the Idaho Panhandle. If
timber planners admittedly cannot accurately define what Old
Growth is, where it is located and how many acres exist, how
can they be expected to preserve those sites and stands
within existing and forthcoming timber sales? What
assurances can be made that the Forest Plan Old Growth
standards will be achieved?
It
is impossible for any district administrator to guarantee
compliance with Old Growth Standards 10b,c,e,f, and g, (FPk
11-29) with current data. If full compliance of all nine old
Growth standards cannot be met under today's situation, the
Forest must take affirmative action to ensure this dwindling
resource is protected.
Table
111-16 in the FEIS at 111-62 indicates the importance of the
"existing old growth" within the suitable and available
timberlands of Management Areas 1,2,3,4, and 7. The USFS has
assigned over two-thirds (69 percent) of the supposed Old
Growth on the entire Panhandle National Forests to intensive
timber management areas. Under current USFS direction,
nothing prevents preparation and sale of Old Growth
forest--even stands within riparian zones--except Public
vigilance and threats of appeal or lawsuits. The success in
deferring Old Growth logging near Priest Lake speaks well
for the openness of one district ranger but cannot be
considered a precedent for the entire Idaho Panhandle
National Forests.
The
Plan fails to set forth a transportation management plan as
part of the overall forest plan that discloses impacts on
Old Growth resources, and specifically address potential
adverse impacts as required by 40 CFR 1502.16 which requires
disclosure of all reasonable foreseeable significant adverse
impacts.
Old
Growth and snags lost to roads and firewood cutting and
gathering should be compensated elsewhere in the Idaho
Panhandle National Forests.
Because
of the uncertainty surrounding the issue of logging Old
Growth remnants, it appears reasonable and prudent that a
moratorium on cutting Old Growth be implemented for the
balance of Decade 1. Allowing these Old Growth acres to
remain in the timber base when there are so many unanswered
questions to resolve and field data to gather is imprudent,
and violates the spirit and intent of both NEPA and
NFMA.
(3)
QUALITY OF OLD GROWTH
Documentation
in both the FEIS and Forest Plan displays a disturbing lack
of sensitivity to the goal of preserving and protecting a
truly representative, high quality remnant of north Idaho's
Old Growth forest. The FEIS at 11-77 states that existing
Old Growth stands (presumably that within the suitable
timber base of Management Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7) will
"eventually be replaced" by "appropriate" unsuitable old
Growth Forest. Plan
item 10c at 11-29 states that "existing old growth
classified as unsuitable for timber management will be given
priority for selection."
Clearly
the Plan's intent is to meet Old Growth and diversity
standards with the least number of acres, with minimal
concern for quality of habitat preserved. The most difficult
objective to achieve (of the existing USFS Old Growth
standards for the IPNF) will be locating high quality stands
of 300 acres or larger. The USFS's open bias towards logging
Old Growth in the highly productive, commercial timber
management areas leaves little hope that anything other than
small, scattered groves of noncommercial quality Old Growth
will be saved.
Contention
B. THE PLAN FAILS TO PROVIDE A REASONABLE RANGE OF
ALTERNATIVES RELATED TO GENETIC DIVERSITY AND OLD
GROWTH.
The
USFS contends that the range of alternatives explored in the
NEPA process fully displayed a range of Old Growth options,
but does not respond to our assertion that a "no old growth
harvest" alternative needs objective review and comparison
with the other alternatives. If the Forest Service on the
adjacent Colville National Forest and at least one other
National Forest in Idaho can display (and in the case of the
Salmon National Forest) select a full EIS alternative that
removes the Old Growth from the timber base--why not on the
Panhandle National Forests? The lack of this alternative
keeps the Public from seeing the true costs and benefits of
such an option. The clear intent of NEPA has not been
achieved.
Contention
D. THE PLAN FAILS TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE MONITORING PROGRAM
FOR OLD GROWTH AND BIOLOGIC DIVERSITY.
The
USFS's fails to mention Old Growth stands or habitat in the
Forest Monitoring Program.
The
agency's proposal to monitor indicator wildlife species is a
laudable objective, but seems a much more costly, involved
and less accurate method of keeping track of the Panhandle's
Old Growth. If the Forest Service wants to know what is
happening to the Old Growth resource, then why plan to try
to locate and inventory mobile, elusive and rare pileated
woodpeckers? Why not just count and measure the well-rooted
Old Growth trees the birds use for nesting and feeding?
Monitoring known, mapped Old Growth forest stands (once a
valid forest-wide inventory is concluded) should be one of
the easiest and least costly items with which to
deal.
Old
Growth forests do not exist merely to provide habitat for
Old Growth dependent birds and other animals. These trees
and the habitat they represent have significant biological,
ecological, aesthetic, and social values just by existing.
If--God forbid--the pileated woodpeckers, goshawks and pine
marten all vanish, we still will want to preserve and
maintain our old Growth trees. A monitoring plan that omits
any direct mention of old Growth and totally ignores the
need for constant and regular oversight of these valuable
stands is unresponsive to the intent of NFMA.
Regarding
the monitoring plan for the Panhandle National
Forests:
(1)
THE PLAN CONTAINS NO BASELINE INVENTORIES OF MANAGEMENT
INDICATOR SPECIES FOR OLD GROWTHHABITAT TYPES.
Knowing
the baseline numbers of each species used to indicate Old
Growth habitat health is essential in gauging the subsequent
impact of habitat change or loss.
Monitoring
for change in the numbers of indicator species depends on
knowing how many of each species exist before and after an
impact. The plan contains no baseline data on management
indicator species for Old Growth habitat.
(2)
SNAG DEPENDENT WILDLIFE SUCH AS PILEATED WOODPECKERS ARE
INADEQUATELY PROTECTED, AND THE PLAN THEREBY FAILS TO
SATISFY ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE BIODIVERSITY UNDER 36
C.F.R. sec. 219.26.
The
Plan selects pileated woodpecker as an indicator species.
The Plan discusses woodpeckers in Appendix X, entitled,
"Snag and Woody debris Management Guidelines." Appendix 11
in Appendix X lists specific hard snag requirements for
different woodpeckers. Yet the Plan fails to rigorously
include these guidelines in the Plan and fails to explore
the adequacy of these recommendations.
Pileated
woodpeckers require habitat consisting of mature forest with
large diameter snags. Pileated woodpeckers are not an Old
Growth dependent species and ought not to be used to
indicate Old Growth forest habitat. [See generally State
of California, Department of Fish and Game. Appeal of
California Department of Fish and Game, in the matter of
Sequoia National Forest Land
and Resource Management Plan and Decision, of Feb 25,
1988.]
The
pileated woodpecker is probably the largest woodpecker found
in North America with the presumed extinction of the
ivory-billed woodpecker. Nowhere throughout their range are
the birds common, and they are becoming more rare. This
woodpecker needs big snags and trees to support the large
nesting cavities. Nests average 8 inches in diameter and two
feet in depth. These large snags are often found in Old
Growth habitat, prompting Forest Service Handbook 553 to
state: "Optimum habitat for pileated woodpeckers is roughly
synonymous with old-growth forest." (Thomas, J.W. ed. 1979.
Wildlife Habitats in Managed Forests - The Blue Mountains
of Oregon and Washington USDA- Forest Service
Agricultural Handbook No. 553, Sept 1979]
Handbook 553 recommends that at least 45 dead trees
be available in good woodpecker territory.
One
Forest Service researcher, J.W. Thomas, has prescribed for
the Forest Service the quantities of "hard" snags which need
to be retained in order to provide habitat for forest
snag-dependent species. [Thomas, J.W. ed. Wildlife
Habitats in Managed Forests-The Blue Mountains of Oregon and
Washington USDA Forest Service. Agricultural
Handbook No. 553, Sept, 1979. His conclusions assume
that existing and resulting soft snags are also
retained.]
Raphael
and White indicate that there is little interspecific
competition between cavity nesting species. [Raphael,
Martin G. and Marshall White, 1984. Use of Snags by
Cavity-Nesting Birds in the Sierra Nevada. Wildlife
Monograph #86, January, 1984.] Snag dependent species
differ in their habitat requirements either in nest-snag
size, height, timing (eg. season), host tree species, or
other parameters. Different cavity nesting species utilize
different snag diameters for nesting. Therefore, different
management indicator species (MIS) would be needed to
indicate the habitat conditions for different snag sizes.
Use of only one species which has a very large size
requirement is certainly not indicative of the general
habitat type to which it has been applied.
The
standards and guidelines for protecting snags and dependent
wildlife should be liberal, based on existing scientific
research. Once snag habitat is logged, it is virtually
irreplaceable. Reynolds, et.al., state that in a 400-acre
study site in Colorado, less than fifteen percent of snags
had any cavities; however trees which had cavities usually
had multiple openings numbering up to eighteen.
[Characteristics of Snags and Trees Containing
Cavities in a Colorado Conifer Forest. Rocky Mt. Forest
Service Research Note RM-455]. Since many cavity nesting
species are territorial, the authors cautioned that clumping
of snags may reduce populations. "Extra" snags need to be
retained to assure that adequate quantities will be usable
by wildlife. This observation is well supported. Raphael and
White (1984) observed three suitable snags for each snag
actually used. Thomas (1979) observed fifteen unoccupied
trees for each tree with a cavity. Bunnell and Allaye-Chan
observed 7.6 and 78 inactive snags for each active snag in
Old Growth forest and second growth forest, respectively.
[Bunnell, Fred L. and Ann Allaye-Chan, 1984.
Potential of Winter Range Reserves for Ungulates as
Habitat for Cavity Nesting Birds. Proc. Symposium Fish
and Wildlife Relationships in Old Growth forests, April
1982].
Ensuring
biodiversity requires that the Plan should provide a larger
number of snags in more diverse sizes and configurations.
Regarding the habitat needs of the pileated woodpecker, the
Plan should assess the habitat needs of this species,
inventory habitat, and then develop standards and
alternatives which meet the Plan's responsibility to ensure
biodiversity. Failure to ensure protection of snag dependent
wildlife violates 36 C.F.R. sec. 219.26.
In
summary, the current Old Growth controversy raging in Region
6 clearly indicates the depth of the Public sentiment and
values. This issue will not evaporate with resolution of the
Oregon/Washington Old Growth stands. Concern for Old Growth
habitat in the interior West and the northern Rockies is
growing rapidly. The USFS acknowledges that its Old Growth
inventory is deficient, and agrees that more research,
better definitions, and monitoring are necessary. Old Growth
in north Idaho is clearly a rapidly dwindling resource of
irreplaceable value; no one refutes this fact. In spite of
the obvious contradictions, the agency continues to view old
Growth largely as a source of high quality, commercial
timber while ignoring the need to preserve the remnant
stands until an unbiased, scientifically sound, land-based
inventory is complete. Without this forest-wide inventory
and a moratorium on Old Growth harvesting, the Forest Plan
goals, objectives and standards remain weak and of marginal
value.
ISSUE
11. THE PLAN INADEQUATELY ASSESSES PLANT PATHOGENS AND
NOXIOUS WEEDS
Failure
to fully disclose issues pertaining to plant pathogens,
noxious weeds, and catastrophic fire will result in
management by crisis. The Forest Service, however, maintains
that the Plan contains "flexibility" to deal with
catastrophic events, and the agency cites 36 C.F.R.
219.27(c)(2).
Diseases
such as white pine blister rust have played a major role in
the Forest Service's justifying past high levels of logging.
Forest Service officials on the Idaho Panhandle are already
aware of problems with root rot. Agency officials also
discuss the impending problem of beetle bark epidemics
moving over the Bitterroot Divide from Montana into the
stands of second growth lodge pole pine in the St. Joe
and Coeur
d'Alene National Forests. Region 1 of the Forest Service is
already facing epidemics of beetle bark on the Kootenai
National Forest, using this epidemic to justify high levels
of logging.
The
issue is not a question of "if" but of "when". The Forest
Service is quite well aware of these problems and should
have fully discussed them in the Forest Plan. One major
purpose of USFS planning is to provide leadership and
stewardship in taking stock of forest resources and past
damage, in anticipating the future, and in protecting and
enhancing Public forest resources. Failure to address the
issues of plant pathogens, noxious weeds, and catastrophic
wildfire violates the agency's full disclosure
responsibilities under NEPA.
The
Forest Plan at IV-10 proposes to monitoring for potential
outbreaks of plant pathogens and noxious weeds every five
years. The agency acknowledges that the reliability and
precision of monitoring are moderate. Yet the agency fails
to provide any analysis as to whether this frequency is
adequate.
The
USFS acknowledges that the forests of the Idaho Panhandle
are at high risk for insect and disease epidemics (ROD 15).
Since the forests are of such extraordinary importance to
the Public for many resources, and the risk for damage is
high, planning documents should have included a full
scholarly and scientific assessment of these problems for
the Public. In 1984 when the regional forester's office
reviewed the alternatives for the IPNF, concerns were raised
about fire by one reviewer: "I can find no mention of how or
if fire management was a consideration in the analysis or
the alternative selection process." [IPNF Planning
Document 2012, appended communication from Walter J.
Tomascak dated May 2, 1984.] Yet the Regional Forester
provided no direction for IPNF planners to address the issue
of fire. Failure to do so makes wise land use decisions for
land managers difficult or impossible. Failure to provide
this analysis violates NEPA and NFMA.
As
a result of epidemics, stands will be more prone to
wildfire. The Inland Northwest has a significant history of
wildfire. In 1910 nearly 3 million acres of forest in north
Idaho and western Montana burned in what the historical
record refers to as the "1910 Fire". Evidence of this
catastrophic wildfire is found in the brushfields of the St.
Joe and Clearwater River drainages, and resulted in some of
the younger stands of forest in the Coeur d'Alene River
drainage. The 1910 Fire also captured the attention of the
nation and led to federal legislation and to Forest Service
policies on forest fires.
On
August 11, 1967, the Sundance Fire began with a lightning
strike near Priest Lake. The catastrophic wildfire that
resulted burned over 50,000 acres. Results from the fire are
still clearly evident in the Selkirk Range. Considering the
Great 1910 Burn and Sundance, and given the ROD's
acknowledging that stands are at high risk for insect and
disease epidemics, the failure of Plan to assess epidemics
and the resulting risks for fire violates NFMA and
NEPA.
The
USFS has some of the greatest fire fighting capabilities on
earth. And yet the Plan fails to draw on expertise within
the agency or in other agencies to assess the combined roles
of insects, pathogens, and fire. Unless corrected the result
will be management by crisis.
ISSUE
12. THE PLAN IS NOT BASED ON A REALISTIC BUDGET
The
agency's response to contention B fails to answer "what part
of each program is actually related to timber
programs."
The
Forest Service's overall response for contentions (A) and
(B) are based on the assumption that it is entirely
appropriate for the agency to develop a plan that, in all
likelihood, will not be budgeted by Congress. We believe
that the Forest Service should develop alternatives and
select a preferred alternative that are based in budgetary
reality. Indeed, the USFS recognized this also when in 1980
the Regional Forester approved the criteria for selecting a
preferred alternative for the IPNF: "The preferred
alternative should be achievable within the 1981-2025
outlook for funding." [letter from Regional Forester Tom
Coston to IPNF Supervisor, dated June 23, 1980. IPNF
Planning Document 3203]
During
the development of the Preferred Alternative, USFS planners
expressed concerns about the huge budgetary increases
necessary to implement the Plan. [See for example IPNF
Planning Document 1756 in which the planning team discusses
the problems of a 36 percent increase in budget and a 146
percent increase in hard money dollars over the 1980
budget.]
In
1983 IPNF Forest Supervisor wrote to the Regional Forester
about the unrealistic budgetary assumptions of the preferred
alternative,
It
is apparent that there is a considerable funding gap
between the Preferred Alternative in our proposed forest
plan analysis and our probable program. [IPNF
Planning Document 3151]
During
the review of the draft plan at the regional office in 1984,
concerns were expressed that "[p]rojections for a
budget increase for the preferred alternative seems to be
wishful thinking these days." Ultimately, the regional
forester did not communicate to IPNF planners any concern or
provide any direction pertaining to developing alternatives
based on a realistic budget. [IPNF Planning Document
2012. Compare the regional forester's letter of June 7,
1984, with concerns raised by Walter Tomascak on May 23 as
appended]
The
Plan and range of alternatives, with their unrealistic
budget assumptions, are invalid for three
reasons:
(1)
THE PLAN FAILS TO EXAMINE A REASONABLE RANGE OF
ALTERNATIVES, VIOLATING NEPA AND ITS IMPLEMENTING
REGULATIONS, 40 C.F.R. Sec 1502.
All
the alternatives in the Plan require annual budgets that are
higher than the average 1980-1983 expenditure level of $20.3
million. (FEIS at 11-128) Many of the most cost inefficient
acres are the most important acres for wildlife and fish,
water quality, and recreation. These acres were pulled into
the timber base in part by assuming unrealistically high
budgets. The Plan's strategy is inconsistent with the USFS's
historic mission and with developing a plan that leads to
the greatest good for the greatest number for the long run
(greatest net public benefits).
NEPA
requires agencies to examine a reasonable range of
alternatives in preparing an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS). 42 U.S.C. sec 4332(2)(C)(iii) and (E); 40 C.F.R. sec
1502.14; Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Regional
Forester, 833 F.2d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1987). Indeed,
NEPA's implementing regulations ("CEQ regulations") describe
the alternatives requirement as the "heart" of the EIS. 40
C.F.R. sec 1502.14.
As
the Ninth Circuit has recently reiterated, "The range of
alternatives considered must be sufficient to permit a
reasoned choice." Methow Valley Citizens Council v.
Regional Forester, 833 F.2d 810, 815 (1987), citing
Save Lake Washington v. Frank, 641 F.2d 1330, 1334
(9th Cir. 1981). Thus, while an agency need not attempt to
consider the entire universe of alternatives, those that it
considers must cover the full spectrum of options. Council
on Environmental Quality, Forty Most Asked Questions
Concerning CEQ's National Environmental Policy Act
Regulations, Question 1, 46 Fed. Reg. 18026, 18027 (1981);
California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 767-68, (9th Cir. 1982)
Massachusetts v. Clark, 594 F. Supp. 1373, 1379-81 (D. Mass.
1984); National Wildlife Federation V. Andrus, 440 F.
Supp. 1245, 1354 (D.D.C. 1977). Further, the existence of an
unexamined but viable alternative renders the adopted plan
and EIS inadequate. Citizens for a Better Henderson v.
Hodel, 768 F.2d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1985).
In
addition, the alternatives must describe a range of
"reasonable courses of action." 40 C.F.R. sec
1508.25(b)(emphasis supplied). NEPA requires "consideration
of reasonable alternatives 'as they exist and are likely to
exist." National Wildlife Federation v. Morton, 393
F. Supp. 1286, 1297 (D.D.C. 1975), quoting Carolina
Environmental Study Group v. United States, 510 F.2d
796, 801 (D.C.Cir. 1975). Implicit in the alternatives
requirement is the premise that the options be capable of
implementation; evaluation of infeasible alternatives would
be a pointless exercise. See, e.g., Westside Property
Owners v. Schlesinger, 415 F.Supp. 1298 (D.Ariz. 1976),
aff Id 597 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1979); City of Romulus v.
County of Wayne, 392 F.Supp. 578 (E.D. Mich.
1975).
Implementation
of the Plan--of any plan--depends critically on funding
levels. Without any consideration of alternatives at lower
and more realistic funding levels, the range of alternatives
in the FEIS is unreasonably narrow, in violation of NEPA.
The Forest Service must reevaluate its selection of
Alternative 13 after considering a range of alternatives
spanning a more realistic array of budget
possibilities.
(2)
THE PLAN FAILS TO REVEAL ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF
THE PLAN, AS ACTUALLY IMPLEMENTED, VIOLATES NEPA AND ITS
REGULATIONS, 40 C.F.R. Sec 1502.
Lacking
money to implement the plan as written, federal officials
will be implementing only parts of the plan or implementing
the plan more slowly. The Forest Service's response
acknowledges this on page 54, "Differences between the
Plan's budget and the appropriated budget may result in
rescheduling activities and cause annual outputs to vary."
Given the history of National Forest budgeting, a high
likelihood exists that water quality, wildlife and fish, and
recreation programs will continue to suffer. NEPA requires
that, "to the fullest extent possible," adverse
environmental effects of major Federal actions must be
disclosed in an environmental impact statement. 42 U.S.C.
sec 4332(C); Methow Valley Citizens Council, 833 F.2d
at 814. While it may be difficult for an agency to
anticipate every environmental effect of a proposed action,
the agency's predictions must be "reasonable." Sierra
Club v. Army Corps of Engineers, 701 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir.
1983); Concerned Citizens on 1-190 v. Secretary of
Transportation, 641 F.2d 1 (lst Cir. 1981). 1 f the
agency does not have sufficient information to enable it to
assess the environmental effects of a proposed action, then
the agency must disclose the gaps in its information, and
assess the relevance of that information to the agency's
conclusions. 40 C.F.R. sec 1502.22.
The
Plan violated these basic principles of NEPA by committing
to a course of action when critical information--the Idaho
Panhandle's budget--was unknown, and without examining the
environmental consequences of implementing the Plan with a
budget substantially lower than the proposed
level.
The
Plan and EIS describe a particular mix of activities and
environmental effects which will occur under the Plan. For
example, the Plan provides that a certain level of timber
will be cut from designated areas, that certain roads will
be built, that logged areas will be reforested, that
environmental effects of logging and roading will be
monitored, that programs will be installed to protect fish
and wildlife, and that recreation opportunities in the
Forest will be enhanced. The FEIS, in turn, reviews the
environmental effects of implementing the Plan. As the Plan
acknowledges, monitoring and mitigation efforts (and,
consequently, the accuracy of the FEIS predictions about the
Plan's environmental effects) depend on funding.
But
the Plan is premised on an unrealistic budget. Disparity
between the Plan's budget and the actual budget -- and the
dramatic inequality in the funding of particular items --
translates into different environmental impacts for the Plan
than those described in the FEIS.
Although
the Forest Service knew that it could not predict how much
money would be appropriated, the agency knew that its budget
was crucial to implementation of the Plan as depicted to the
Public. The relevance of that unknown funding information
could and should have been fully disclosed in the FEIS, 40
C.F.R. sec 1502.22, and the Forest Service should have done
an analysis of the Plan's environmental effects, given a
lower -- and more likely -- budget.
(3)
THE FOREST SERVICE'S SELECTION OF ALTERNATIVE 13 CONSTITUTES
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AGENCY ACTION, VIOLATING THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT, 5 U.S.C. Sec
706(2)(A).
Federal
agency action is arbitrary and capricious "if the agency has
... offered an explanation for its decision that runs
counter to the evidence..." Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
Budgets
do not exist to carry out this forest plan. The Federal
Government, an agency of which developed this Forest Plan,
is deeply in debt.
The
Chief of the Forest Service, Dale Robertson, recently
acknowledged that the agency will face funding problems in
the USFS's "The Friday Newsletter" (March 3, 1989). The
Chief makes it very clear that funding problems for all
forestry programs are significant problems:
the
1990 Reagan Administration budget version . . . calls for
an eight percent appropriations cut from 1989, plus
absorbing inflation hikes. It includes a three percent
reduction in research and a 44 percent drop in [State
and Private Forestry]. I noted that the budget
authority for 1990 National Forest System line items is
about 70 percent of the land management plan
proposals.
In
other words, the Administration's proposed level of funding
is 30 percent short nationwide on all plans.
The
Plan and ROD offer no explanation for the Forest Service's
assumption that, beginning this year, Congress will annually
award to the Forest Service sufficient funds to budget the
Idaho Panhandle National Forest at levels higher than in the
past. Yet the Plan contains no "contingency" plan in the
event the Plan, or any part of it, is
underfunded.
In
selecting Alternative 13, with the near certainty that it
would not be funded at its proposed budget level, and the
consequences of such underfunding, the USFS has "entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,"
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 43.
Moveover, the Forest Service, in selecting an alternative
whose budget bears no relation to its own experience with
budget realities, has failed to "articulate a satisfactory
explanation for its action including a 'rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made.'" Id. at 43,
quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371
U.S. 156, 168 (1962). Thus the USFS's selection of
Alternative G-M, which rests on a premise which is
improbable at best, was arbitrary and capricious.
The
failure to develop a Plan for the Idaho Panhandle National
Forest based on a realistic budget further flaws this
government document. The USFS should withdraw the Plan and
provide a Forest Plan that is consistent with the mission of
the National Forests, environmentally sound, and affordable
for the American taxpayer.
ISSUE
13. THE PLAN INADEQUATELY ADDRESSES THE OUTDOOR RECREATION
RESOURCE.
Contention
A-A.OVERALL RECREATION INVENTORIES ARE
INADEQUATE
The
Forest Service asserts that it has provided an adequate
inventory of recreational use of the Idaho Panhandle
National Forests.
The
agency's analysis, however, is deficient in several critical
aspects. It fails to address the cumulative impact of loss
to the outdoor recreation resource from roading and logging
programs on multiple ownerships. For example, trails in the
Avery District on the checkerboard land are being severely
impacted by Plum Creek Timber Company's liquidation.
Similarly, fish and wildlife habitat damage resulting from
roading and logging programs on all ownerships will reduce
wildlife and fish populations. Increased access will
increase hunting and fishing pressures on areas with
increasingly damaged habitat. The result will be reduced
hunting and fishing success, and reduced or closed hunting
and fishing seasons. The only real opportunity to protect
these habitats and resulting recreation is on National
Forest land. The Plan is, however, silent on these issues
and therefore glaringly violates NEPA and NFMA. in addition,
the Plan presents no monitoring program for assessing
outdoor recreation, in violation of the monitoring
requirements of NFMA.
The
USFS response suggests that a travel management plan is done
which complies with legal requirements. The record should be
clear that despite the huge and growing road network on the
Idaho Panhandle and all the problems and threats this poses
to other resources, the Plan does NOT contain a travel
management plan that tiers to the goals of the Forest Plan.
Nor does the Public know how other resources (e.g., fish,
wildlife, clean water, hunting, fishing) will be protected
from a huge and expanding logging road network.
Contention
C. TRAIL INVENTORIES ARE INADEQUATE
The
Forest Service asserts that a trail inventory is contained
in the Plan: "The forest trail inventory compiled by the
Forest recreation staff identifies the trail resource and is
an inventory of existing facilities, their condition and
use." (p. 58) The agency provides "Exhibit 1811 as
evidence.
Exhibit
18 consists of a sample trail inventory form. The completed
forms were not part of the decision documents. The Plan is
virtually silent on this important Public
resource.
ISSUE
14. THE FOREST SERVICE FAILED TO WORK WITH OTHER AGENCIES
AND TRIBES
The
Forest Service asserts that it communicated with other
agencies and tribes during the planning process. The Plan
fails, however, to disclose to the Public how the Forest
Service intends to resolve differences with other agencies
and tribes. For example the Idaho Dept of Fish and Game,
Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, U.S. Department of
Interior, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and Upper
Columbia United Tribes all raised serious concerns about
water quality protection during the draft comment period.
Yet the final plan provides even less water quality
protection than does the draft plan (e.g., more aggressive
entry into "deferred" drainages).
ISSUE
15. THE PLAN FAILS TO ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF A HUGE
AND EXPANDING ROAD NETWORK
Hunting
and fishing are a way of life in the Rocky Mountain Region.
The forests of north Idaho support important sport fisheries
and big game species, as well as threatened or endangered
species such as woodland caribou, grizzly bear, and gray
wolf. Under this Plan, men and women who hunt and fish and
the greater Public will lose priceless fish and wildlife
resources in north Idaho.
A
general response will be followed by responses to specific
contentions.
THE
PLAN DOES NOT INVENTORY ROADS, DISPLAY FUTURE ROADS, OR
CONTAIN A TRAVEL MANAGEMENT PLAN
The
Public's wildlife and fisheries are destroyed by (1) habitat
damage and (2) excessive hunting and fishing pressures.
Building roads into forests or allowing unrestricted
vehicular access into a forest will destroy fisheries and
wildlife by destroying habitat and by accessing habitat to
vehicular traffic. The Plan does not contain an inventory of
its existing road system. While the Plan does contain maps
pertaining to transportation management (exhibit 24), the
Plan fails to assess how the transportation management plan
meets the goals of the overall Plan (e.g., wildlife, flora,
water quality).
The
Plan fails to include a transportation plan to deal with
road closures that tiers to the goals of the Plan. Yet road
closures are issues of volatile Public interest. While
building a road into a forest may be controversial, that
controversy pales in comparison to closing roads. If
wildlife and their habitats are to be protected, and if the
Forest Service cannot successfully close roads in wildlife
habitats, then the Forest Service should not build the
roads. The Plan does not display inventories of existing
roads (maintained and unmaintained, with a combined network
of about 10,000 miles of roads), does not display maps of
proposed roads, and contains no Travel Management
Plan.
1.
The Plan violates Forest Service Regulations on roads and
travel management
Current
Forest Service directives covering the inventory and
management of roads and trails require that "all . . .
facilities that provide access and mobility" to the forest
must be inventoried (Forest Service Manual (FSM) 7703.1).
Finally, FSM 2431.36b makes it clear that "temporary" roads
must be used "only for short-term non-recurrent purchaser
use" and are to be closed to public use.
2.
The Plan violates the National Forest Management Act (NFMA)
as pertaining to roads and travel management
NFMA
requirements direct the Forest Service to evaluate and
revegetate those roads not added to the Transportation
System:
Unless
the necessity for a permanent road is set forth in the
forest developmentroad system plan, any road constructed
with a timber contract or other permit or lease shall be
designed with the goal of reestablishing vegetative cover
on the roadway and areas where the vegetative cover has
been disturbed by the construction of the road, within
ten years after the termination of the contract, permit,
or lease either through artificial or natural means. Such
action shall be taken unless it is later determined that
the road is needed f or use as part of the National
Forest Transportation System. (16 USC sec 1608
(b))
In
sum, NFMA and Forest Service regulations require that
- (1)
all travelways be inventoried,
- (2)
all "temporary" roads be closed to public use, and
- (3)
only those roads no longer usable and that have been
returned to the production of trees, forage, or other
vegetative resources may be dropped from the inventory.
If
these requirements are met, the inventory can be used to
evaluate the effects associated with uses of all existing
travelways.
Accurate
road and trail inventories are also necessary for
implementation of NFMA requirements that off-road vehicle
use be regulated to minimize negative effects on natural
resources (36 C.F.R. sec 219.21(g), sec 219.27(a)) and that
the Forest Service maintain and improve habitat for
indicator species of wildlife (36 C.F.R. sec 219.27(a)(6)).
On the Idaho Panhandle National Forests these include elk,
woodland caribou, moose, and grizzly bear, all of which are
sensitive to the effects of roads.
3.
The Plan violates the Endangered Species Act (ESA) by not
providing road inventories, location of future roads, and a
travel management plan
The
ESA prohibits significant disruption of the feeding,
breeding, and sheltering habits of threatened and endangered
species. Disruption by public use of roads and trails may
constitute a "taking" of the species.
Section
7 of the ESA also requires the best scientific and
commercial information available be used in managing
threatened and endangered species. The Plan must follow
these requirements when evaluating the effects of roads and
trails on threatened and endangered species such as woodland
caribou and grizzly bear. A noted expert on grizzly bears,
Dr. Charles Jonkel, has written to the supervisor of the
Flathead National Forest in Montana that roads should be
inventoried, closed where appropriate, and
revegetated:
As
you are well aware, there exists a large number of
temporary roads or spur roads which have never been
numbered, inventoried or mapped, but which remain open to
ORV use and to other human traffic. To conserve the bear,
each of these roads in . . . (occupied habitat]
should be inventoried then be effectively closed (Zager
and Jonkel 1983) . . . . To properly favor the bear, the
most effective road closure is revegetation. If roads are
closed but remain in existence, there is still a
significant activity level due to hikers, ORVs,
motorcycles, and the like. [Jonkel, C., 1987,
letter of comment on the Flathead Forest Plan
(2/15/87)]
4.
The Plan violates the National Environmental Policy Act.
The
requirements of NEPA control all planning of activities and
programs on the National Forests. NEPA requires that the
Forest Service evaluate the impacts of roads and trails not
only at the individual project level, but cumulatively at
the forest-wide level. A proper inventory is necessary where
roads are being planned for a timber sale, and also where
roads and trails must be coordinated and assessed
cumulatively with the Forest's Travel Plan, Transportation
Plan, and Forest Plan.
Contention
A. INFORMATION ON ROADS IS INADEQUATE
The
Forest Service asserts that it will protect other resources
in the face of a large and expanding road system. Standards
will be used on a project by project basis.
The
agency does not discuss the problems resulting from the
existing massive road network, the risks of damage resulting
from road failures (e.g. road failures at Bluff Creek in the
Avery District), and the cumulative impact of logging roads
and skid trails in north Idaho, irrespective of land
ownership. Planning for this massive road system will
require basic forest soil and slope inventories--which were
not part of the Plan.
Contention
B. THE USFS INAPPROPRIATELY POSTPONES IMPACTS AND COSTS OF
ROAD NETWORKS
The
USFS states that it has analyzed the environmental costs of
road-building, giving as an example the following statement:
"The cost per road mile is based on the percent side slope,
mitigation costs on sensitive soils, and geologic factors."
Yet at the time the ROD was signed, the soils inventory was
still several years from being completed. Therefore it is
not possible for the agency to determine the environmental
costs of its road program under the Plan. Such costs are
necessary to develop the budget the agency includes in the
Plan, as required by 36 C.F.R. 219.12(g)(i).
The
Forest Plan selects an ASQ of 280 MMBF which commits the
Idaho Panhandle to continued high levels of road building.
Since 54 MMBF will come from roadless areas, the agency will
be building roads into areas more rugged and more fragile
than areas already accessed.
The
Plan contains an ASQ and overall strategy that commits the
Public to high levels of road-building that cannot easily be
reversed at the project level. Either the ASQ is deceptively
inflated and in reality roads will not be built or the
Public can expect continued high levels of road building
with greater damage in areas now roadless. Simply deferring
these overall decisions to the project level is
inappropriate and violates the full disclosure requirements
of NEPA.
The
issue of the Forest Service failing to develop a realistic
budget is covered at issue 12.
Contention
C. ADVERSE IMPACTS ON WILDLIFE
The
Forest Service's response suggest that it has a road closure
program. Yet as discussed in contention D (below) no such
program exists.
As
noted previously, the Forest Service has no transportation
management plan in place that tiers to the Forest Plan. It
assumes that it can continue building roads and close some
existing roads. Yet this assumption has yet to be tested in
the face of vocal opposition to road closures from some
local inhabitants and reluctance by Forest Service
officials. The Forest Service will continue expanding its
massive road network on the Idaho Panhandle, and offers only
the assumption of a road closure program that will work in
order protect the internationally significant wildlife
resources in north Idaho.
Until
an effective travel management program is in place that
tiers to the Plan, the Forest Service's promises to protect
wildlife and other resources from the agency's road network
are empty promises. USFS planners themselves have raised
concerns about the ability of the agency to enforce a road
closure program. For example, planners have raised concerns
about the problems of road closure enforcement for wood
cutting and the impact on elk. [IPNF Planning Document
1756]
Poaching
is a major threat to the internationally significant
wildlife resources on the Idaho Panhandle. An expanding road
network will result in increased access, which will result
in increased risks of poaching. Failure to provide this
analysis violates the full disclosure requirements of NEPA.
The Forest Service in exhibit #22 ("Modeling Elk Potential
on the Kaniksu") states that the agency assumes habitat
potential for elk will not go below 10 percent due to road
densities. This assumption has not been field tested, and
therefore not subject to peer review. NEPA requires
scientific integrity. 40 C.F.R. 1502.24.
Contention
D. ROAD CLOSURE AND REVEGATATION
The
USFS wants to build more roads for logging. Logging roads,
however, damage wildlife habitat. mitigating new and past
damage will require the agency to close newly constructed
roads as well as roads built in previous years. Road
closures are extremely unpopular with the Public of the
Inland Northwest. The result may be that the Forest Service
builds new roads and fails to deliver on its promises to
develop a transportation plan. Wildlife would be, once
again, the big loser under the Forest Service.
If
the agency is saying in the response to our Statement of
Reasons that it has met its legal requirements for a travel
management plan by simply referring the Public to the ranger
district level plans, then NEPA would require that these
individual plans should have been part of the overall forest
planning process. Otherwise, the Public never knows how the
Forest Service will keep the broad, sweeping claims it makes
about protecting wildlife.
If
the agency is saying that it intends to defer transportation
planning to the district level at some future time, then the
Forest Service violates NEPA by failing to address the
cumulative impact of variably determined and enforced road
closure programs on wildlife resources.
ISSUE
16. THE PLAN PROPOSES AN UNPRECEDENTED LEAP IN THE ASQ FOR
THE SECOND DECADE, BOOSTING THE ASQ FROM 280 MMBF TO 350
MMBF.
The
USFS appears to be taking a position that the 350 MMBF is
now only a projection, not a decision.
The
forested watersheds of north Idaho have been damaged already
by overcutting in the best tree growing sites, therefore the
ASQ of 280 MMBF is unrealistic. The projected ASQ of 350
MMBF during the second decade is outrageous and
insupportable.
The
USFS inserted the 350 MMBF figure into the ROD after closing
the comment period to the Public. This "projection" and its
impact were never disclosed to the Public for review and
comment during the period of Public comment. As such, the
ROD violates the full disclosure requirements of
NEPA.
Both
the 280 MMBF and the 350 MMBF figures are disturbingly
inflated and deceptive. Yet these inflated figures may be
used incorrectly by timber corporate officials, community
and political leaders, and federal budgetary planners to
make irreversible commitments and decisions leading to
economic hardship, environmental damage, appeals, lawsuits,
and unnecessary divisiveness in the Inland Northwest. We can
not have "business as usual" when the best stands are
already logged and the bills for environmental damage are
flooding in. We are in the midst of an historic transition,
and this is nowhere reflected in this Plan.
ISSUE
17. THE PLAN INADEQUATELY ADDRESSES SOIL PRODUCTIVITY AND
REFORESTATION FAILURES
The
USFS maintains that the Plan's landtype mapping addresses
the problem of glacial till soils and landforms.
As
noted in our Statement of Reasons, soils are a forest's most
fundamental resource. The Plan was completed prior to the
completion of landtyping for the Idaho Panhandle. The Forest
Service includes areas in the timber base without knowing
their soils and slopes. Without completing the inventory of
landtypes prior to determining the timber base, areas are
included in the timber base which carry high risks of
reforestation failure and watershed damage. This flies in
the face of reforestation and watershed requirements of
NFMA, and violates the full disclosure responsibilities of
NEPA. The consequence is that the timber base is illegally
inflated, falsely justifying an inflated ASQ, which then
misleads the Public.
The
Forest Service provides as Exhibit 45 an article authored by
Ferguson and Boyd on bracken ferns. (Bracken Fern
Inhibition of Conifer Regeneration in Northern Idaho,
Research Paper INT-389 Feb. 1988)
The
issue is not bracken fern. The issue is umbric soils.
Similar to two intersecting circles, a relationship does
exist between umbric soils and bracken fern. Bracken ferns
may or may not grow on umbric soils. Umbric soils may or may
not support existing bracken fern vegetative types. The
issue is umbric soils do exist on the Idaho Panhandle: these
soils carry a high risk of reforestation failure, the USFS
did not inventory these areas, and umbric soils are included
in the Plan's timber base in violation of NFMA and NEPA. The
issue is not bracken fern.
ISSUES
3. 18. 19. 20. THE PLAN IS BASED ON A COMPUTER MODEL THAT
DOES NOT REFLECT REALITY
See
Exhibit 1. Randall O'Toole: Reply to Idaho Panhandle
Responsive Statement. June 20, 1989
The
USFS supported the forestry principle of nondeclining even
flow during the legislative process that led to the National
Forest Management Act. In 1976 the agency advised Congress
that "nondeclining even-flow tends to support income flows
and community stability, and minimizes chances of community
disruption caused by significant reduction or acceleration
in timber harvest." [Letter from John R. McGuire, Chief,
S. 2296, 93d Cong., lst Sess., 119 Cong. Rec. 26,797 (1973),
reprinted in Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and
Forestry, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Compilation of the Forest
And Rangeland Renewable Resources Act of 1974, at 20-24
(Comm. Print 1979).
The
Plan for the Panhandle National Forests, however, runs
entirely counter to the principle of nondeclining even flow.
The Plan violates NFMA on this issue. More importantly, the
long term impact on local communities could be devastating.
The results of a single computer model which inaccurately
reflects the reality on the three national forests
comprising the Idaho Panhandle are environmental damage and
agency decisions in violation of law.
The
USFS's response to the appellants' concerns raised in our
Statement of Reasons pertaining to the appropriateness of
combining the three proclaimed National Forests in a single
FORPLAN model and single Plan merely repeats the
justification given in the EIS documents.
The
USFS argues in the responsive statement that no decision is
being made beyond the first ten to fifteen years. "LTSY
[long term sustained yield] is not exceeded in any
proclaimed Forest in the first period for which the decision
is made." [Response at 79] Yet in the ROD the agency
makes it clear that it "intends" to follow a course that
will bring the agency in direct violation of nondeclining
even flow requirements of NFMA:
I
have decided to establish an average annual allowable
sale quantity (ASQ) of 280 MMBF which can be sold in the
first decade. I intend to increase the ASQ at the end of
the ten-year plan period to the projected second decade
timber harvest level. This will be an approximate
increase of 70 MMBF per year to a new ASQ level of 350
MMBF per year. This increase will dependent [sic]
on future market conditions. If, after ten years, the
Forest Plan is not revised and if conditions dictate, I
intend to allow for this increase. [ROD at
5]
In
response to a Sept. 17, 1986 letter from Sen. McClure
directing the Chief of the USFS to set specified levels of
logging for the Panhandle National Forests, the Chief
responds again that the Forest Service's intention is to
increase the ASQ at the end of 10 years.
The
USFS is sending the Public different messages. The agency is
reassuring Sen. McClure and timber companies that it
"intends" to increase the ASQ on the Panhandle National
Forests to 350 MMBF in 10 years. Conversely in the
responsive statement, the Forest Service is arguing that
decisions for future decades are not being made.
Forests
grow slowly from the perspective of human time frame.
Sustainable use of our forests requires the long term view.
The reality is that the first planning period cannot stand
alone; it is inextricably linked and dependent upon the
volumes, increases and decreases of all the subsequent
decades in the ASQ schedule.
(A)
LEGAL REQUIREMENT: PLAN FOR EACH "PROCLAIMED" NATIONAL
FOREST
The
USFS may prepare a single forest plan for "all lands for
which a Forest Supervisor has responsibility." 36 C.F.R.
219.4(b)(3). While on one hand the responsive statement
argues that "the IPNF is one National Forest Administration
Unit," nearly every Congressional law passed for the
National Forest System pertains to individually "proclaimed"
National Forests, not "administrative units" (see O'Toole,
Exhibit 1 at 5). Moreover, failure to develop a Plan for
each of the individually proclaimed National Forests of the
Panhandle results in a Plan that overcuts north Idaho, in
violation of Sec. 11 of NFMA.
Although
Exhibit 46 is referenced in the Summary of Documentation,
the information and national/regional direction in this
exhibit is largely ignored. Exhibit 46 clearly describes a
process and minimum informational requirements that must be
made available to the Public in EIS documents when a
proposed forest plan covers combined portions of two or more
"proclaimed" National Forests.
(B)
LEGAL REQUIREMENT: NONDECLINING EVEN FLOW
The
resulting Forest Plan (based on a computer model) must
comply with NFMA and other environmental laws. The wisdom of
developing separate computer models and separate plans for
the St. Joe, Coeur d'Alene, and Kaniksu National Forests can
be readily seen in the consequences of using a single model
for all three: the one Plan for the Panhandle National
Forests violates the principle of nondeclining even flow,
and violates NFMA.
While
the Forest Service keeps the overall Idaho Panhandle cut
steadily increasing over time, the agency hides the widely
fluctuating cuts on each of the individually proclaimed
National Forests that comprise the Idaho Panhandle. One
forest after another is overcut: the cut goes up
dramatically and then drops. This is graphically depicted in
O'Toole's review on page 6, exhibit 1.
Remember
that community industries and USFS administrative jobs
depend on these logging levels. And remember also that the
USFS defends its Plan on the basis of "community stability."
What happens when the ASQ on a single National Forest swings
wildly? The Public might imagine that the Plan intends for
wheels to be placed on timber mills and USFS offices, moving
structures around north Idaho to follow the timber cut as it
shifts from one National Forest to the next. Long term
sustained yield will be violated with long term consequences
for timber dependent communities.
The
USFS argues that new data will come to light sometime in the
future and allow the agency to justify what it is doing.
Logging for wildlife, logging for water quality, logging for
scenic beauty, and other "Multiple-Use" logging could allow
the USFS to depart from the principle of Nondeclining Even
Flow (NDEF) . The USFS fails, however, to show how road
building and logging enhances "Multiple-Use" in the sweeping
context sufficient to justify departure from nondeclining
even flow.
The
potential significance of the USFS's decision to violate
nondeclining even flow cannot be understated. The importance
emerges upon scrutiny of the future f or the St. Joe, Coeur
d'Alene, Kaniksu, and entire Panhandle Forests as envisioned
by the USFS in the Panhandle Forest Plan. Again, the USFS
may wish to refer to the graphic presentation of this
material by O'Toole.
(i)
KANIKSU NATIONAL FOREST
On
the Kaniksu portion of the Panhandle National Forests, the
Long Term Sustained Yield (LTSY) for the entire Kanisku
National Forest (742.8 MMCF/decade) is exceeded in decades 8
and 10 on the portion administered by the Panhandle, and
also in decade 6 for the entire proclaimed forest. The
Panhandle "overage" is quite significant, ranging from 35
percent in decade 10 to 50 percent in decade 8 (when
utilizing the Panhandle's Kaniksu portion LTSY of 566.5). In
these same two decades the LTSY is exceeded by 14 and 27
percent respectively by the combined planned ASQ of the
Panhandle, Kootenai, and Colville National
Forests.
Declines
in the ASQ from one decade to the next occur in six decades
out of thirteen for the Panhandle portion, and seven times
for the entire Kaniksu National Forest. These are not minor
declines; the drop from decade 8 to decade 9 on the
Panhandle portion totals about 56 percent, or 475.2 MMBF.
This is followed by an unrealistic jump of 101 percent in
ASQ from decade 9 to 10.
(ii)
COEUR D'ALENE NATIONAL FOREST
The
proclaimed Coeur d'Alene Forest is totally administered as a
component of the Panhandle National Forests. Any explanation
of multiple planning impacts is without merit in respect to
the ASQ planned for the overall Panhandle National Forests.
The Coeur d'Alene's LTSY (413.6 MMCF/decade) is exceeded in
five decades out of 13. The percentage of excess ASQ ranges
from 6 percent in decade 12; 13 percent in decade 7; 19
percent in decade 6; 20 percent in decade 13; and 50 percent
in decade 9.
Declines
in ASQ from one decade to the next occur four times; two of
these are very major reductions of 62 and 67 percent
(decades 7-8k, and 9-10). As described above for the Kaniksu
National Forest, following these radical ASQ cuts the Plan
shows huge upward jumps, with one of 175 percent.
(iii)
ST. JOE NATIONAL FOREST
The
St. Joe National Forest was treated in a similar manner by
FORPLAN and forest planners. That portion of the St. Joe
within the Panhandle National Forests has a LTSY of 290.1
MMCF/decade, and exceeds this in five decades out of
thirteen. The largest excesses total 28 and 30 percent over
LTSY.
The
LTSY figure for the entire "proclaimed" St. Joe National
Forest (administered through the Panhandle and Clearwater
National Forest) is 453.8 MMCF/decade. LTSY for the St. Joe
is exceeded four times out of thirteen, the largest overcut
of 43 percent would occur in decade 5.
Declines
in ASQ between decades is planned four times on the St. Joe,
the greatest drop between decades 5 and 6 (71 percent).
Again, there are numerous large jumps upward of ASQ between
decades, ranging from 31 percent to as high as 144 percent
(decades 6-7).
(iv)
PANHANDLE NATIONAL FORESTS
The
total LTSY for the administrative Panhandle National Forests
(1270 MMCF/decade) is exceeded in three decades out of
thirteen: decades 8, 10, 12. If the displayed LTSY of 1232
from Table IV-15 (FEIS IV-50) is the correct figure rather
than 1270, then 62 percent (8 decades) of the ASQ levels for
the Plan are in violation of LTSY principles. No explanation
or justification is available in the FEIS or Responsive
Statement to explain how or why this basic timber management
precept is ignored.
The
USFS also plans for declines in ASQ between decades 8-9,
10-11, 12-13 on the entire Panhandle Forests.
The
USFS dismisses all of these future LTSY excesses and
departures from nondeclining even flow by saying in the
Responsive Statement, "[D]ecisions are made for the
first planning period only." The reality is that the first
planning period cannot stand alone; it is linked and
dependent upon the volumes, increases and decreases of all
the subsequent decades in the ASQ schedule.
Although
the first decade ASQ volume was "hardwired" (determined as a
result of RPA goals), and was not allowed to be generated by
the linear program model to meet PNV and other modeling
constraints, the outyear ASQ volumes and deviations are
related. The original intent of the nondeclining even flow
direction was to develop a long term harvest schedule that
did not decline from one decade to the next.
What
the Forest Service has done for the Panhandle is to develop
multi-decade timber programs, to display the results for
timber companies and the broader Public as state-of-the-art
representations of future timber programs, and then dismiss
all of this in the responsive statement. At the same time,
the Chief is assuring Sen. McClure that the agency "intends"
to carry out the second decade leap.
If
these outyear ASQ volumes are unconstrained by law,
regulation, or agency policy in respect to LTSY or
nondeclining even flow, then volumes for decades 2-13 should
not be displayed, discussed, or dangled before the Public.
Presenting such information is misleading and builds false
expectations--especially for mill owners and their
stockholders. Investments in new mills and mill automation
could be made based on these data when, in reality, the
timber doesn't exist or is unavailable for logging. (For
example, Plum Creek Timber Company recently suggested that
it might build a new mill in north Idaho or eastern
Washington.) If such investments are made, the result might
be increasing conflict over forest resources and accusations
of Forest Service deception.
(C)
AGENCY DIRECTIVES ON MEETING THE INTENT OF SEC. 13,
NFMA
NFMA
Section clearly directs the USFS to calculate sustained
yield (LTSY) for individually proclaimed National Forests
(in this case, the St. Joe National Forest, the Coeur
d'Alene National Forest, and the Kaniksu National Forest).
Administratively combined units, such as the Idaho Panhandle
National Forests, should not be used as the basis to
calculate sustained yield. The problem of doing so is
clearly demonstrated with the agency's Panhandle Forest
Plan. The Chief's letter of August 29, 1984, in the Forest
Service exhibit 46 raises this concern because of
anticipated Public challenges on this important
issue.
The
Chief's letter specifically lists three options "if the
preferred alternative for the Forest Plan exceeds the
sustained yield level on a proclaimed National Forest in
any decade . . ." (emphasis added). These are: (1)
reduce the level of logging, (2) have a departure approved,
or (3) increase investments to maintain logging levels. The
USFS's Plan for the Panhandle clearly and repeatedly
violates the intent of NFMA Section 13 in respect to LTSY
for the St. Joe, Coeur d'Alene, and Kaniksu National
Forests, but none of the three options was discussed in the
FEIS or selected for implementation.
Exhibit
46 clearly states, "If the analysis indicates that the sale
volume exceeds the long term sustained yield capacity for a
given decade or decades this schedule would be
identified as a departure." (at 8) The exhibit goes on
to state at 9, "In those situations where the planned sale
volume for a given decade is less than the sale volume for
the preceding decade, the sale volume must be either
retained and identified as a departure of adjusted to
provide for a nondeclining flow" (emphasis added). No
departure approval was requested or approved for the
Panhandle National Forests Plan. The USFS made no
adjustments in the ASQ to remove declines between decades.
The direction in exhibit 46 applies not just to first decade
but to later decades.
The
USFS and the greater Public should be aware that the
direction, analysis procedure, and disclosure process
displayed in Exhibit 46 was available to the USFS in
mid-1984. Forest Service officials subsequently reviewed the
Plan in Washington, D.C. in 1985 before releasing the Plan
as a draft for public comment in 1985. The concerns of the
appellants about sustainable yields and departures were
brought to the attention of the Forest Service as early as
1985. The USFS had two years to correct these problems
before issuing the final plan in September, 1987. The agency
simply ignored these problems. Although the raw data dealing
with ASQ and LTSY are displayed in the FEIS as required by
this national direction, the USFS at all levels chose to
ignore the analysis and the required adjustments.
(D)
IMPACT ON TIMBER SUPPLY: CONCEPT OF "WORKING
CIRCLES"
The
USFS's response pertaining to the issue of using climax
conditions does not focus on the issue we raised in the SOR:
the Coeur d'Alene and St. Joe National Forests contain vast
stands of lodge pole pine that the plan is not taking into
account. The Plan covers the next 10-15 years of time,
during which it is unlikely that the lodge pole pine will
reach a climax state.
The
USFS maintains that more detailed information on
stratification and site productivity will be provided at the
project level. But the USFS starts with an inflated ASQ and
timber base, which pushes the timber and road building
program forward onto sites ill-suited for long-term timber
production. The district ranger is not likely to stand in
the way of the Plan's high timber targets and resulting
Congressional funding and political pressure.
The
linkage between the first planning cycle and future planning
cycles is essential to understand how the USFS inflated the
timber base of the Idaho Panhandle.
Central
to this is the USFS's inaccurate use of timber price trends.
The USFS assumes that timber prices increase over time
(relative to costs and other resource values). Timber price
trends combined with culmination of mean annual increment
(CMAI) result in delays in logging and increase the suitable
timber base during the first decade. More simply, the USFS
includes large areas in the suitable timber base because the
agency has faith that in logging of low commercial value
forests will become more valuable over time.
The
refusal of the USFS to revise the economic components of the
Plan before the Regional Forester signed the ROD in
September, 1987, is unacceptable. As Randall O'Toole points
out (Exhibit 1, p. 7), the USFS has done this for other
National Forests. O'Toole concludes,
If
the Idaho Panhandle had followed the example of the
Carson and Bridger-Teton, it might have avoided
publishing a final plan that is based on completely
spurious data. As it is, the forest may have to follow
the example of the Santa Fe, which was forced to
completely revise its plan when its original final plan
was found to be based on erroneous data.
ISSUE
21. THE PLAN FAILS TO ADEQUATELY ADDRESS AND PROTECT THE
VISUAL RESOURCE.
Clearcutting
and road-building are devastating the scenic beauty of the
Northwest. Moreover, the Forest Service's clearcutting
policies sparked the lawsuit on the Monongahela National
Forest which, in turn, gave birth to the National Forest
Management Act and forest planning. Despite this history and
the Public's clear and growing opposition to clearcutting,
the Idaho Panhandle Plan calls for clearcutting and
road-building.
The
Forest Service Manual requires that the visual resource be
treated equally with other resources. (FSM 2380.3(3)) As
with water, fish, wildlife, and outdoor recreation, the
visual resource takes a back seat to road building and
logging in the Plan.
The
final Plan is an alternative, 13, which calls for damaging
the visual resource in exchange for increased levels of
logging. The USFS does not respond to the issue raised in
our Statement of Reasons that the agency used form letters
to justify reductions in the visual resource.
The
Forest Service strategy to damage the visual resource in
order to meet timber targets in the Plan is significant, and
should have been disclosed to the Public for comment. The
agency's failure to disclose this planned damage to the
visual beauty of north Idaho violates NFMA and
NEPA.
Tremendous
damage to the visual resource has already occurred in north
Idaho. This damage is continuing to mount unabated on all
ownerships. Forestland ownership under which the visual
resource can be best protected is on National Forest land.
Yet the Plan damages the visual beauty of the Idaho
Panhandle. The cumulative damage of logging and
road-building on all forestland owners past, present, and
future would argue that north Idaho will not remain a place
of beauty. Rather, north Idaho is being trashed and the
Forest Service is partly responsible.
Exhibit
2 more fully discusses the deficiencies in the Plan's
treatment of the visual resource. This exhibit provides the
Forest Service with another summary of the requirements of
planning for and protecting the visual resource, and how the
Plan fails to meet these requirements.
Inventory
of the visual condition is contingent upon future funding.
The existing visual condition is listed as an additional
data requirement that will be consistent with budget
allocations. (FP, II-16 to II-17). The existing visual
condition is also inventoried during project level
investigations before project implementation. (USFS
response, p. 84)
The
Public should play an important role in making decisions
about the Panhandle's visual resources. USFS Handbook 462
details the methodology for inventorying the visual
resource. The emphasis here is on Public input. Yet the USFS
did not consult the user Publics as envisioned in Handbook
462. Specifically, sensitivity levels were never identified
of quantified. Sensitivity levels are an integral part of
the inventory process; without measuring people's concerns,
the output (VQOs) is unrealistic, perhaps meaningless
because nobody (including the USFS) knows what the Public
wants protected. The USFS similarly failed to consult the
Public in any meaningful when in 1986 it decided to reduce
the visual resource. In 1986, the USFS combined the
Modification VQO with the Maximum Modification VQO,
departing from the VMS. The Visual Absorption Capacity was
never employed, also in violation of USFS Handbook
462.
Plans
should be based on present and anticipated uses. Yet the
Panhandle Plan did not assess sensitivity levels and thus
will be unable to anticipate what type of sensitivity levels
(and hence VQOs) to anticipate.
ISSUE
22. THE PLAN INADEQUATELY DISCLOSES THE POTENTIAL OF
PROTECTING RIVERS AS "WILD AND SCENIC RIVERS".
The
Forest Service fails to respond to the NEPA arguments raised
in the Statement of Reasons.
ISSUE
23. THE PLAN INADEQUATELY PROTECTS WILDLIFE.
Contention
D. CHANGES BETWEEN DRAFT AND FINAL ON ROADS IN ELK SUMMER
RANGE.
The
USFS maintains that it does not want to self-impose a 20
year closure on roaded areas in order to provide security
for wildlife. The agency argues that such closures are "too
restrictive" because of "standards requiring periodic entry
for multiple use management and protection of
resources."
The
Idaho Panhandle has a massive road network which threatens
wildlife security. The Plan pushes roads further and further
into areas critical for wildlife. Yet no transportation
management plan is in place. And the agency, in its response
on this issue, is not willing to commit itself to staying
out of critical habitats once roaded. The Forest Service
uses "Multiple-Use" as an argument to keep from protecting
wildlife, one of the "Multiple-Uses" of the National
Forests.
Contention
E. ELK NUMBERS AND ELK HABITAT
The
Forest Service maintains that it does not have to look at
elk populations, only at elk habitat when assessing the
adequacy of protecting the nationally significant elk
resource on the Idaho Panhandle.
The
Forest Service is the agency responsible for wildlife
habitat. Wildlife populations are inextricably tied to these
habitats. The size, diversity, and health of these wildlife
populations directly reflect the health of the habitat.
Failure to assess elk populations in addition to elk habitat
risks an irretrievable commitment of elk habitat over large
areas of north Idaho without adequate analysis and
trade-offs ever being disclosed to sportsmen. The result
will likely be an end to the world class hunting now found
in north Idaho--and elk hunters will never know it until the
resource is gone.
ISSUE
24. THE PLAN INADEQUATELY ADDRESSES THREATENED OR ENDANGERED
SPECIES, INCLUDING CARIBOU, GRIZZLY BEAR, AND GRAY
WOLF.
The
USFS has failed to answer appellants request for relief
pertaining to caribou. Appellants refer the agency to page
291-92 and Appendix D.
One
issue of concern is the gray wolf. Appellants recognize that
this is a controversial issue.
Nonetheless
the gray wolf, like other threatened and endangered species,
is inadequately discussed in the Plan in violation of the
Endangered Species Act.
The
USFS says that it will maintain a population of 25 grizzly
bears under all alternatives. These alternatives contain
different targets in road miles and other variables. As
discussed above, the Plan contains no transportation
management plan that tiers back to the goals of the Plan.
The Plan fails to set forth a monitoring program for road
closures. Meanwhile existing populations of grizzly bears
are suffering serious mortality from poaching, also
discussed above. The Forest Service fails to provide any
scientific rationale for its position that 25 grizzly bears
will be maintained under all alternatives.
Maps
of habitat for threatened and endangered species are not
provided to the Public in the Plan.
The
Forest Service has failed to address cumulative effects for
threatened and endangered species. For example, the
cumulative effects model programs "will be used when they
become available." (Forest Service response, at 97).
Cumulative effects should be considered prior to making
decisions about programs impacting habitat for threatened
and endangered species. Otherwise the Forest Service may be
negligent in meeting their legal responsibilities under the
Endangered Species Act.
The
Forest Service has not shown that its plans to close roads
will actually work. Yet an effective road closure program is
critical for the future of wildlife in north Idaho because
of the thousands of miles of existing and planned roads. A
Forest Service researcher, J. L. Lyon, noted that vehicular
traffic of forest roads evokes an avoidance response from
elk, and argues for effective road closures. ["Road
density models describing habitat effectiveness for Elk"
Journal of Forestry Sept. 1983.] K. Hammer
assessed the effectiveness of road closure programs on one
district on the Flathead National Forest and found that 38
percent of road closures were ineffective in fully
restricting passenger-type vehicles. [An On Site
Study of the Effectiveness of the USFS Road Closure Program
in Management Situation 1 Grizzly Bear Habitat, Swan Lake
Rang-ar Dist., Flathead National Forest, Montana Nov.
1986.] Researchers Zager and Jonkel note that roads are
detrimental to grizzly bears, and give specific
recommendations for road construction. [Zager, P.E., and
C.J. Jonkel. Managing Grizzly bear habitat in the
Northern Rocky Mountains. Journal of Forestry, August,
1983.]
Road
building and timber harvest are scheduled for grizzly bear
habitat and there is clear potential for loss of bear
habitat. This is in violation of 50 C.F.R. 17.40(b)(1)(i)
which states
.
. . no person shall take any grizzly bear in the 48
conterminous states of the United States.
"Take"
is defined as follows:
ESA
sec 3(18) The term "take" means to harass, harm . . . or
attempt to engage in any such conduct.
"Harass"
is further defined in the CFR regulations:
50
C.F.R. 17.3 "harass". In the definition of "take" in the
Act means an intentional or negligent act or omission
which creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by
annoying it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt
normal behavioral patterns which include, but are not
limited to, breeding, feeding or sheltering.
Loss
of grizzly bear habitat that results from road-building and
logging will cause a "taking" of grizzly bear, in violation
of the Endangered Species Act.
The
Plan also fails to provide adequate protection for caribou.
The Forest Service states that it will "enter" some caribou
habitat every 20 years. (Appendix N). Yet the IPNF planning
record 28, p. 35, referenced by the agency in their
response, states:
Caribou
habitat should be managed to simulate old-growth conditions.
Caribou habitat should be managed as old-growth or with an
extended rotation age.
The
Plan fails to disclose how the Forest Service intends to
"manage" in order to "simulate" Old Growth forest types, or
precisely which characteristics of Old Growth they are
attempting to maintain to protect caribou.
APPENDIX:
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
-
- Randall
O'Toole
- Cascade
Holistic Environmental Consultants
- 425
West Third #2
- Eugene.,
Oregon 97401
- (503)
686-CHEC
20
June 1989
Reply
to Idaho Panhandle Responsive Statement
Pages
15 through 18 and 76 through 82 of the Forest Service's
responsive statement to the appeal of the Idaho Panhandle
plan deals with economic issues covered in CHEC's review of
that plan. This paper presents CHEC's reply to those
issues.
Issue
3: Economics
A.
Timber Price Trends
The
responsive statement contends that a "sensitivity analysis"
of the price trends used in the Idaho Panhandle FORPLAN
model found "that updated prices and trends did not have a
significant influence on changing land use outputs and
effects from the original Forest Plan formulation" (p. 15).
In fact, the opposite is true.
FORPLAN
is a computer program that attempts to model the real world.
The model succeeds if it behaves the way the real world
behaves. The model fails if it behaves dramatically
different from the real world. Price trends have a
significant distortional effect on the FORPLAN model because
they make it behave different from the way forest managers
would normally work.
The
Forest Service policy of sustained yield or nondeclining
flow aims to produce relatively constant amounts of timber
over time. As implemented by forest managers in the past,
annual sale quantities would be calculated to be the
greatest level that can possibly sustained over time. This
is in accordance with the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act
of 1960 which defines sustained yield as "the achievement
and maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level annual or
regular periodic output of' timber from the national forests
(16 US C 531; italics added).
Another
way of describing this calculation is that managers limit
the suitable timber base to those lands that are needed to
achieve and sustain the first decade timber sale level.
Lands not needed to sustain that level have traditionally
been excluded by the Forest Service from the timber base.
This is in accordance with the forest planning rules, which
specify that lands must be excluded from the suitable base
if they "are not cost-efficient, over the planning horizon,
in meeting forest objectives, which include timber
production" (36 CFR 219.14(c)(3).
The
rules define "objective" as "a concise, time-specific
statement of measurable planned results that respond to
pre-established goals" (36 CFR 219.3). Price trends are not
a "planned result" that responds to a Forest Service goal;
they are simply an effect of timber markets that are beyond
the control of forest managers.
Price
trends can cause the FORPLAN model to fail to model reality.
When combined with predicted timber growth rates, they often
project that net timber values per acre are increasing
faster than 4 percent per year, i.e., faster than the
discount rate. FORPLAN thus delays cutting timber until the
timber values stop growing faster than 4 percent, which is
usually by the fifth decade.
This
delay in timber cutting leads FORPLAN to propose a low-level
periodic output of timber in the first decade, which
violates the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act. Viewed
another way, FORPLAN proposes a much larger suitable timber
base than is needed to sustain the first decade timber sale
level, which violates forest planning rules. This is because
the increase in cutting rates after the first decade is not
due to a forest objective but to the price
trends.
Because
of these problems, CHEC has always recommended that FORPLAN
be run without price trends. At the forest planners
discretion, price trends can be used to calculate present
net values outside of FORPLAN, but they should not be
allowed to influence the suitable timber base. Such
influences fail to model the reality of forest management
objectives as defined by the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield
Act and the forest planning rules. CHEC's recommendation has
been followed by many forests in Region 3, 5, and
elsewhere.
In
response to CHEC's review of the draft Idaho Panhandle plan,
the Forest Service did two sensitivity runs to determine the
effects of price trends on FORPLAN. Neither run was made
with no trends; instead, they were made with trends based on
the 1985 RPA price trends rather than the 1980 RPA trends.
Although the 1985 trends were only slightly lower than the
1980 trends, they demonstrate CHEC's contentions regarding
the effects of trends on FORPLAN.
As
noted in the final EIS, "when the original higher real price
increases were included [in FORPLAN], PNV was
increased by delaying harvest to a later decade. With the
lower real price increases there is no incentive to delay
harvest for PNV gains." Thus, "the maximum PNV [FORPLAN
run] first decade harvest increased by 11 percent" when
the lower price trends were used (FEIS p. H- 132). The run
with lower trends also had a 14 percent lower fifth decade
timber sales which led to a 14 percent smaller suitable
timber base.
Meanwhile,
the draft preferred alternative run cut 12 percent less in
the fifth decade when lower trends were used, which also led
to a 12 percent smaller suitable base (EIS p. 11133). The
first decade harvest was controlled by a constraint, leaving
it unchanged from when the higher trends were used. But
these runs clearly showed that the model was very sensitive
to the price trends.
If
no price trends were used, as recommended by CHEC, the
differences in results would be even greater. Benchmark U,
which maximized timber subject to nondeclining flow,
proposed to cut almost exactly the same amount of timber in
the fifth decade as the first (615 mmbf in the fifth vs. 614
mmbf in the first, as shown on p. B-96 of the DEIS). Given a
timber base, the Idaho Panhandle is capable of producing a
"high level" of timber sales in the first decade, that is,
the same level as in the fifth decade. Given a first decade
level of timber sales, the Panhandle's suitable timber base
need not be larger than the number of acres needed to
produce the same level in the fifth decade.
Thus,
if no price trends were used, the fifth decade timber sale
level could be the same as the first in any of the
alternatives. The increases in timber sales in most of the
alternative are due solely to the price trends. In turn, the
large suitable timber bases proposed by any of the
alternatives reflects the high fifth decade sale level, not
the low first decade sale level.
The
selected alternative FORPLAN run constrained the model to
produce at least 250 million board feet per year in the
first decade. Due to the price trends, most unconstrained
FORPLAN runs increased cutting levels by an unacceptably
high percentage between the first and second decades.
Planners responded to this by constraining FORPLAN "to
provide gradual harvest increases" over the first 50 years,
at a rate of about 50 million board feet per year (FEIS p.
B- 15). The fifth decade rate was thus 450 million board
feet.
These
increases were not "objectives" as defined in the forest
planning rules. Instead, their sole purpose was to "avoid
sharp or dramatic increases in volume from decade to
decade." These increases were due solely to the price
trends. They should have been avoided by eliminating the
price trends, not by building them into the model
constraints.
The
responsive statement points out that "planning horizon" is
"the full 130 years analyzed, in contrast to the planning
period of 10 to 15 years" (p. 17). This does not change the
fact that the increases in timber sales are not due to
forest "objectives" but instead to timber price
trends.
The
first decade timber sale level of 250 million board feet is
only 56 percent of the fifth decade sale level of 450
million board feet. This means that a full 44 percent, or
over 700,000 acres, of the suitable timber base is not
needed to sustain the first decade timber sale level.
Instead, it is included in the suitable base only because of
the price trends and planners improper response to the
effect of those trends on the model.
Because
of the price trends, then, the Idaho Panhandle plan violates
the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act because it does not
produce a high level of timber sales in the first decade.
More importantly, it violates the forest planning rules
because its suitable timber base is not cost-efficient.
Instead, about 44 percent of that base is not needed to
sustain the first decade timber sale level. Paying the costs
- including, for example, fire protection and silvicultural
examination - needed to include those lands in the base is
not needed.
Moreover,
the inflated suitable timber base allows forest managers to
be non-cost efficient because they can sell timber from
areas that are less valuable than FORPLAN proposes. If, for
example, managers sell timber from land in the first decade
that FORPLAN proposes should be sold only in the fifth
decade, the managers may spend far more accessing the timber
than needed. Yet nothing in the plan requires managers to
strictly follow FORPLAN's schedule.
Section
6(k) of the National Forest Management Act requires that
land that is not economically suitable for timber management
be withdrawn from the timber base. NFMA explicitly states
that unsuitable lands are to be reviewed every ten years to
see if conditions have changed that would make them
suitable. Instead, the Idaho Panhandle plan includes in the
suitable base all the lands that the Forest Service
projects, based on speculatively high price trends, might be
needed to increase timber sales in the next 50
years.
In
allowing price trends to distort the FORPLAN model, planners
have developed a forest plan that violates the Multiple-Use
Sustained-Yield Act, section 6(k) of the National Forest
Management Act, and section 219.14(c) of the forest planning
rules.
B.
Below-Cost Sales
B-1.
Below-Cost Sales and the Suitable Base
The
Forest Service admits that 223,360 acres of the selected
suitable timber base will lose money if managed for timber
at this time. But it claims that these acres are included in
the base to "meet other resource benefits such as wildlife
and visual quality." This reflects a profound
n-fisunderstanding of the FORPLAN model.
In
fact, all of these acres are included in the base because of
the price trends. These trends allow FORPLAN to project that
these lands will make money in the future even though they
lose money today.
Although
FORPLAN does not propose to sell timber from these lands in
the first decade, by including them in the base planners
make the lands immediately available to timber cutting.
Forest managers, who are not required to consult FORPLAN's
cutting schedule, may propose sales on these 223,360 acres
in the next few years.
This
is an important reason why the suitable timber base is not
cost-efficient. If the base included only those lands needed
to sustain first decade sale levels and only those lands
that produce the highest net benefits, then none of the
below-cost lands would be included in the base.
B-2.
Below-Cost Sales and Fair Market Value
The
Forest Service says that below-cost sales do not violate
NFMA's requirement that sales not be sold for less than
market value because "market value is determined by the
bidders on a sale," not by the costs of selling the timber.
This ignores the Forest Service's own definition of "market
value," which reads:
Market
value as used by the Forest Service is timber appraisal is
the price acceptable to a willing buyer and seller, both
with knowledge of the relevant facts and not under
compulsion to deal. This price is sometimes called fair
market value. Appraised value and fair market value as used
by the Forest Service mean the same. [FSM
2421.31
By
only calculating whether the buyer would be willing to buy a
sale, as the Forest Service's appraisal process does, the
Forest Service ignores the most important part of the market
value test: whether a seller would be willing to sell the
timber. No willing seller would repeatedly sell a product
for less than cost.
C.
Community Stability
As
with item B-1 above, claims that 160,047 acres of below-cost
land in the suitable base were needed to protect community
stability misunderstand or misrepresent the FORPLAN model.
None of these acres were needed to sustain first decade
timber sales. If increases in timber sales are needed after
the first decade, such increases should be considered in a
future revision to the forest plan.
D.
Cost-Efficiency of the Suitable Base
The
Forest Service says that allocation of management areas 19
and 20 to low intensity timber cutting increases "suitable
acres in response to other concerns over the suitable timber
base" (responsive statement, p. 17). Here, the responsive
statement refers to p. 10 of the record of decision. That
page does not state which "other concerns over the suitable
timber base" led to this change. Instead, it simply states,
"The areas which were changed to NLA, 19 and MA 20 because
of the timber present [sic] do not add to
first-decade harvests but do add to future potential harvest
levels." Perhaps a line is missing from this
statement.
This
35,000-acre area is a perfect example of areas in the
suitable base that are not needed to sustain the first
decade timber sale level. Neither the record of decision nor
the EIS specifically state that these areas will not be cut
in the first decade. If any sales are proposed in these
areas, they will be definition be not cost-efficient because
their costs would be higher than other first decade sales
that had been planned by FORPLAN.
Page
9 of the record of decision suggests that the suitable
timber base is larger than needed to sustain the first
decade sale level in order to "retain the flexibility to
expand timber volumes to meet potential increases in the
next decade." This flexibility is already built into NFMA,
which, as already noted, provides that unsuitable lands
should be reexamined every ten years. By including these and
other submarginal areas in the suitable base today, the
forest plan allows if not invites costly timber sales and
wasteful management.
Issue
18: Stratification of Forest Sites
Forest
planning rules require planners to stratify the forest "into
categories of land with similar management costs and
returns." The Idaho Panhandle stratified land using "habitat
types," which are based on the climax forest of various
areas. Yet some parts of one habitat type may be pure
lodgepole pine stands while others may be cedar and hemlock
forests, two forest types with very different management
returns.
Since
lodgepole pine is almost always an early successional
species, and rarely a climax forest, little or none of the
Idaho Panhandle forests were classified as lodgepole pine in
the FORPLAN model. Instead, classifications were limited to
"hemlock," "grand fir," "alpine fir ... .. unsuitable," and
"all others." Most lodgepole pine was included in the
hemlock habitat type.
The
responsive statement says that "this does not mean that all
the land in a class is assumed to be at that climax
condition." Yet the FORPLAN timber prices for the hemlock
habitat type reflected the high values of that forest type.
Thus, the portions of this type that are currently stocked
with lodgepole pine, whose value is much lower, were greatly
overvalued in FORPLAN.
Issue
19: Three Forests in One FORPLAN Model
The
Forest Service's policy on this issue is an interesting
mixture of double-talk. On one hand, the responsive
statement states that "the IPNF is one National Forest
Administration Unit," even though every Congressional law
ever passed that uses the term "National Forest" refers to
"proclaimed forests," not administrative units.
On
the other hand, the Forest Service, in other forest plans,
admit that departures from nondeclining flow often take
place when two forests are combined in the FORPLAN model.
Although barely mentioned in appendix B of the forest plans,
the Forest Service apparently believes that such departures
are authorized by NFMA. However, that law only authorizes
departures for the purposes of multiple-use and when
consistent with multiple use.
The
IPNF responsive statement admits that "base sale levels for
[individual forests in] future decades will, at
time, exceed the calculated LTSY [long-term sustained
yield]." However, the responsive statement claims that
this is justified by the fact that "no decision is made in
the Forest Plan beyond ten to fifteen years" and LTSY is not
exceeded in the first decade. Of course, the plan does
decide to include in the suitable timber base about 700,000
acres of land that are not needed to sustain the first
decade level of timber sales. But it is still true that the
LTSY of any of the three forest is not exceeded by the first
decade cutting level of those forests.
The
responsive statements emphasis on LTSY is misplaced. The law
reads limits "the sale of timber from each national forest
to a quantity equal to or less than a quantity which can be
removed from each forest annually on a sustained yield
basis." Rather than mention sustained yield capacity, the
law focuses on limiting sales in any given year to a level
less than or equal to any future year.
The
wild see-sawing of cutting rates calculated for the three
forests by FORPLAN does not close to meeting this test
(figure one). Moreover, projected future cutting levels on
two different forests - the Coeur d'Alene and St. Joe - fall
below the proposed first decade cutting rates for those
forests. For example, the first decade cutting level of the
portion of the St. Joe managed by the Idaho Panhandle is 154
million board feet, but in the sixth decade this falls to
just 108 million board feet.
The
Forest Service responsive statement claims that "there are
no departures for the first decade for any of the three
proclaimed forests" (p. 79). In fact, the EIS states that
205 million board feet per year will be cut from Coeur
d'Alene in the first decade while only 204 will be cut in
the tenth.
Although
this is just a small departure, an even larger departure is
possible on the St. Joe if the yield tables used by the
Clearwater Forest are wrong. Unlike the Idaho Panhandle
yield tables, which are much more realistic, the Clearwater
yield tables project a huge increase in volume in
second-growth stands over existing timber. This increase
allows the Clearwater to project a cut in decade 6 that is
nearly double that of the first decade. If this projection
were based on Idaho Panhandle yield tables, the St. Joe
Forest would have a large departure between the first and
sixth decade.
In
sum, the selected alternative departs from nondeclining flow
on individual proclaimed units, both by allowing sale levels
to greatly fluctuate from decade to decade and by allowing
sales in future decades to fall below the first decade sale
level.
Issue
20: Timber Prices and Trends
CHEC's
reply to the discussion of price trends is mostly found
above. In this section, the Forest Service claims that "it
was impractical to incorporate new data and reanalyze all
resource benchmarks and alternatives." In fact, many forests
have done so when they found that their original data were
wrong.
Some
forests, such as the Okanogan, Shasta-Trinity, and Klamath,
did the reanalysis after the first draft plan and
incorporated it into a revised draft plan. Still others,
such as the Bridger-Teton, Carson, Lincoln, and Gila,
performed such reanalyses between their draft and final
plans.
If
the Idaho Panhandle had followed the example of the Carson
and Bridger-Teton, it might have avoided publishing a final
plan that is based on completely spurious data. As it is,
the forest may have to follow the example of the Santa Fe,
which was forced to completely revise its plan when its
original final plan was found to be based on erroneous
data.
|